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INTRODUCTION

Despite indications that the Reagan Administration will accord
a relatively low priority to the abatement of nuclear proliferation,
events such as the apparent nuclear explosion in the South Atlantic on September 22, 1979,1 Pakistan's program to develop enrich-

ment and reprocessing facilities,2 and the Israeli raid on the Iraqi
reactor sites demonstrate that the problem is not diminishing.
Moreover, the inconclusive results of the International Nuclear
1. See, e.g., Betts, A Diplomatic Bomb? South Africa's Nuclear Potential, in
NON-PROLIFERATION AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 283-84, 300-04 (J. Yager ed.

1980).
2.

See, e.g., Betts, India, Pakistanand Iran, in NON-PROLIFERATION AND U.S.

FOREIGN POLICY 102, 328 (J. Yager ed. 1980).

3. See N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
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Fuel Cycle Evaluation, presented at the Final Conference in February 1980,' are likely to result in an acceleration in the development and spread of reprocessing and fast breeder reactor technologies. Sharply divergent views on proliferation issues also were
revealed at the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference of 1980, which resulted in a total impasse.5 These differences
of opinion are further complicated by the new round of vertical
proliferation between the United States and the Soviet Union
which seems imminent as a result of apparent breakdown in the
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). 6 Such developments
suggest that the existing non-proliferation regime may begin to
unravel in the near future at an accelerating pace.
At such a juncture, it is of vital importance that we gain a fuller
appreciation of the perspectives of potential nuclear powers such
as Brazil. New efforts aimed at controlling nuclear proliferation
must take into account the views of such nations in order to have
any realistic chance of success. The principal goal of this article is
to contribute to such understanding within a concrete policy context. This article consists primarily of a hypothetical review
memorandum written for Brazilian President Joao Baptista Figueiredo by a hypothetical Brazilian policymaker offering advice
on two issues of immediate concern to Brazil. The first involves
proposals for the establishment, under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) auspices, of an International Plutonium
Storage (IPS) regime designed to prevent the stockpiling of plutonium by individual nations.7 The second issue involves the question of what action Brazil should take, if any, in order to
strengthen the legal regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, popularly known
as the Treaty of Tlatelolco.8 Both issues are considered against
the background of the increasing non-proliferation pressures
which have been exercised against Brazil and other potential or
"threshold" nuclear weapons states, and the need for Brazil to
respond to such pressures in an optimal manner to secure its own
4. See notes 34-37 infra and accompanying text.

5. See note 113 infra.
6.

Negotiations on theater nuclear forces in Europe likewise show little sign
ARMS CONTROL AND DIsARMAMENT AGENCY, 1980
ANNuAL REPORT 97-114 (1981).
7. See notes 38-41 infra and accompanying text.
8. See note 18 infra and accompanying text.

of progress. See generally U.S.
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national interests and foreign policy objectives.
The unorthodox format of this article has been adopted to convey the way in which nuclear power and non-proliferation issues
are perceived through Brazilian eyes. This can best be achieved
by placing the reader in the shoes of a hypothetical Brazilian
policymaker. This approach should be highly useful, for a common shortcoming of United States officials and legislators in this
area is their failure to recognize-on both cognitive and affective
levels-that officials from countries such as Brazil may be proceeding both rationally and in good faith.
This Introduction discusses the background and general context within which the two issues addressed in the hypothetical
Brazilian memorandum must be considered. In Part H(A),9 the
memorandum sets forth the general perspective from which Brazilian policymakers are likely to view issues related to nuclear
power and non-proliferation. This exposition should be particularly useful in view of the great reluctance to discuss issues of
military security (including the potential nuclear rivalry with Argentina) that Brazilian officials have demonstrated in the past. 10
In Part II(B),11 the general Brazilian framework for decision is
used to clarify the issues involved in the establishment of an international depositary for the storage and control of plutonium,
and to analyze the desirability of such a depositary. A hypothetical draft Brazilian proposal for such a regime is presented. As an
example of how Brazil and other developing countries could seek
to link vertical and horizontal proliferation, the draft includes
provisions aimed at reducing military stocks of plutonium held by
nuclear weapons states. Part 11(0)12 examines the relevance of the
Treaty of Tlatelolco to a Brazilian strategy for dealing with foreign-and perhaps even domestic-non-proliferation concerns,
and highlights the strengths and weaknesses of that Treaty. Finally, the Conclusion 3 returns to the perspective of this Introduction and attempts to objectively draw together some of the
broader implications which arise from consideration of the hypo-

9. See notes 45-134 infra and accompanying text.
10. See generally Courtney, Brazil and Argentina: Friendly Choices for
Friendly Rivals, in NON-PROLIFERATION AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 264, 269 (J.
Yager ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Courtney].
11. See notes 140-91 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 192-241 infra and accompanying text.
13. See note 242-55 infra and accompanying text.
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thetical Brazilian memorandum. In addition to providing insight
into Brazilian views, the present article should contribute to a
greater understanding of the potential defects to be avoided in
designing an IPS sheme, as well as the strengths and weaknesses
of the Tlatelolco regime.
A. Responding to Non-ProliferationPressures:Brazil's
Options
The hypothetical Brazilian review memorandum which follows
is limited to a consideration of two Brazilian policy options: support for the establishment of an International Plutonium Storage
regime and full ratification (i.e., waiver of the unanimous ratification requirements) of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There are, however, four other options which Brazil theoretically might consider
in responding to non-proliferation concerns.
The ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty represents one
possible option. At this juncture, however, it is extremely unlikely
that Brazil would seriously consider the NPT option. Historically
opposing the NPT as discriminatory in nature, Brazil could incur
considerable diplomatic costs and loss of credibility if it adopted
this sharp reversal of policy. Accession to the NPT would also
mean foregoing the development of peaceful nuclear explosive devices (PNEs) and the acceptance of full-scope safeguards (which
also may be required under the Treaty of Tlatelolco). Consequently, NPT ratification is not an attractive option for Brazil,
particularly in light of the Tlatelolco option.
A second option for Brazil would be to accept full-scope safeguards over all of its nuclear activities in order to meet current or
future demands of the nuclear supplier states. Full-scope safeguards, however, would probably contain a "no explosive use" requirement which would effectively prohibit the development of
PNEs. If these safeguards are to be accepted, Brazil would probably prefer to act within the framework of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,
in order to avoid the appearance of submitting to the unilateral
non-proliferation demands made by the United States and certain other nuclear supplier states. It therefore appears unlikely
that Brazil would unilaterally accept full-scope safeguards.
A third option would be to promote the establishment of an
international or multinational nuclear fuel bank. Brazil would
have little incentive to participate in such an arrangement, for an
international fuel bank would add nothing to the assurance of
fuel supply acquired under the 1975 Brazilian-German Agree-
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ment. This assessment conceivably could change if the facility
were established in Brazil and offered significant commercial advantages without requiring the abandonment of Brazil's independent development of enrichment and reprocessing facilities. The
establishment of a regional fuel cycle or reprocessing center would
be treated similarly. Although this third option cannot be entirely
ruled out, the establishment of an IPS regime would have a much
greater likelihood of being accepted in the short term and would
be a prerequisite to the consideration of more complicated
schemes.
Finally, Brazil could voluntarily forego the development of national enrichment and reprocessing. After surviving the United
States onslaught on the issue of sensitive technologies, however, it
is extremely difficult to imagine any circumstances under which
Brazil would surrender gains already achieved and facilities
whose development and construction are far advanced.
Support for an IPS regime and full ratification of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco therefore represent the principal options realistically
available to Brazilian decision-makers willing to strengthen the
non-proliferation regime. It is for this reason that the following
hypothetical Brazilian review memorandum focuses on these options. The reader should assume that the following memorandum
has been written by an independent, rational Brazilian policymaker who has been asked by President Joao Baptista Figueiredo
to review the advisability of proceeding with Brazil's nuclear program and to consider whether Brazil should contribute to nonproliferation efforts by supporting an IIPS regime or fully ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The hypothetical memorandum does
not purport to represent the official views of the Government of
the Federative Republic of Brazil; it merely suggests the way in
which a rational Brazilian policymaker might view these issues.
B.

The Present Non-ProliferationRegime 4

Three strategies have been adopted, by nuclear weapons states
14. The following statement provides a succinct overview of the nuclear fuel
cycle and the possible routes to nuclear proliferation:
Nuclear power stations generate electricity from the heat produced
when the nuclei of the atoms of heavy material are split. The nuclear reactions that produce the heat in this way take place in a reactor. The heat is
then used in a boiler to produce steam to drive conventional turbines.
The material used as the fuel in current nuclear power stations is usu-
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and nuclear supplier states in efforts to control the spread of nually uranium. However, other possible fuel cycles, for example cycles based
on thorium, have been considered.
Uranium ore occurs naturally in the earth's crust and is mined by conventional mining techniques. It is then processed into a form suitable for
using as fuel in a nuclear reactor. Natural uranium contains two main isotopes, U-238 and U-235. Only the nuclei of the U-235 atoms are readily
fissile, i.e. capable of being split, under most conditions, but U-235 accounts for only about 0.7% of natural uranium. Therefore, although some
reactors use natural uranium as their fuel, most reactors now use slightly
enriched uranium, in which the proportion of U-235 atoms has been artifically increased or "enriched" by U-235 taken from a further quantity of
natural uranium. Consequently, most of the uranium that is mined is enriched after processing and before it is fabricated into fuel elements for
loading into a reactor.
Inside the reactor the fuel is irradiated (i.e. nuclear fission reactions are
allowed to take place). The U-235 atoms, when split, form lighter elements, known as fission products, some of which are highly radioactive.
Some of the U-238 atoms are also transformed in the reactor to form heavier elements, also radioactive. The most important of these is plutonium
since Pu-239, the isotope of plutonium produced in the largest quantity, is,
like U-235, fissile and therefore a potential fuel; indeed some of the plutonium so formed is then subsequently fissioned and releases energy while
the fuel remains in the reactor. About one third of the energy released
while the uranium fuel is being irradiated comes from the fission of
plutonium.
The heat produced by the fission reactions is removed by a cooling agent
that passes over the fuel and transfers the heat to the steam circuit which
is linked to the turbine. In some types of reactors liquids, such as ordinary
(light) water or heavy water, are used as the coolant; in others, gases such
as carbon dioxide are used. The largest number of power reactors currently in operation use light water, and are generically referred to as Light
Water Reactors (LWRs). There are two main types of LWRs: The Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR). But
there are also significant numbers of Heavy Water Reactors (HWRs), particularly in Canada, which has developed the CANDU HWR, and of GasCooled Reactors, particularly in France and the U.K.
When the spent fuel is discharged from the reactor, it contains unconsumed uranium, fission products, plutonium and some other heavy elements. It generates heat and is radioactive and is placed in storage ponds
filled with water to cool. When it has cooled sufficiently, it is possible to
dissolve the spent fuel and chemically process ("reprocess") it in order to
extract the unused uranium and plutonium. These materials can then be
fabricated into new fuel elements and recycled to the reactor. When new
fuel elements are fabricated in this way they contain a mixture of uranium
and plutonium, the plutonium providing the main fissile material in the
fuel.
Three different types of fuel cycle are commonly identified depending
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clear weapons. The first, a strategy of denial, seeks to deny potenon whether or not the spent fuel is reprocessed and, if it is, to what type of
reactor the uranium and plutonium are recycled:
[1] In the once-through fuel cycle the spent fuel is not reprocessed
but kept in storage ponds until it is sent for permanent disposal, for
example by conditioning it and burying it underground in a deep
geological repository.
[2] In thermal reactor recycle the spent fuel is reprocessed and the
uranium and plutonium are separated from the fission products
which are conditioned, for example by vitrification, and disposed of
in a deep geological repository. Both the uranium and the plutonium
can then be recycled in new fuel elements to reactors of basically the
same type as that in which the plutonium is initially produced. (Alternatively, it is possible to recycle only the uranium and to store the
plutonium and vice versa).
[3] In fast breeder reactor cycle the spent fuel is similarly
reprocessed and the uranium and plutonium fabricated into new fuel
elements. They are, however, recycled to fast breeder reactors
(FBRs), in which there is a central core of uranium/plutonium fuel
surrounded by a blanket of depleted uranium, i.e. uranium from
which most of the U-235 atoms have been taken during the process
of enrichment of other uranium. This depleted uranium therefore
consists mostly of U-238 atoms, some of which are converted to plutonium during irradiation. By suitable operation, such reactors can
produce slightly more plutonium than they consume (hence the
name "breeder"), the precise mode of oper~ation depending on the
need for plutonium.
Both thermal and fast breeder reactor recycle necessitate facilities for
the storage of separated plutonium until required for recycle and arrangements for the transport of plutonium between sites, in addition to
reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants and the facilities for the storage or
disposal of wastes. Transport of separated plutonium is not necessary if
the reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants are located on the same site.
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EvALUATION, SuMMARY 281-82, 284 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as SUMMARY].
The "front-end" of the nuclear fuel cycle includes the mining of uranium ore,
which contains only about 0.2% of U.0.. The ore is then processed at a mill,
which produces a product known as "yellowcake" in which the concentration of
U30 8 has been increased to between 75 and 85%. Yellowcake contains only
about 0.7% of the isotope U-235, and therefore must be sent to a conversion
plant which converts it to uranium hexafluoride (UF), which is then sent to an
enrichment plant. There the concentration of U-235 is increased to approximately 3%, before being sent to a fuel fabrication facility where it is converted
into uranium oxide (U%2 ) and shaped into pellets which are enclosed in fuel
rods. A number of fuel rods are placed together into fuel assemblies and are
then ready for insertion into the reactor core. Heavy water reactors (HWRs)
require no enrichment, and, therefore, fuel elements may be made directly from
yellowcake; HWRs require the use of heavy water, however, and production of
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tial nuclear powers access to nuclear materials, equipment, and
technologies which would give them the capability of building nuclear weapons. The second, a strategy of warning, attempts to secure timely and adequate warning in the event a nation diverts
nuclear materials or equipment from their intended peaceful pur-

the latter is technologically difficult. See generally J.
OPERATION IN NUCLEAR ENERGY

YAGER, INTERNATIONAL CO-

5-9 (1981).

The "back-end" of the fuel cycle may consist simply of storage and disposal of
irradiated or spent fuel in the case of the once through cycle. The alternative is
a "closed" cycle in which spent fuel is first stored at the reactor site until it
cools. It is next sent to a reprocessing facility which yields plutonium, uranium,
and nuclear waste products. The plutonium is then transferred to a fuel
fabrication plant where it is converted into plutonium oxide (if it is not already
in that form) and shaped into pellets together with uranium oxide to make
mixed oxide fuel. The uranium produced by reprocessinZ must be enriched
again, and thus reenters the "front-end" of the fuel cycle. Finally, the radioactive nuclear wastes produced by reprocessing must be stored or permanently
disposed of.
Two aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle are particularly sensitive, for they may
also be used to produce the component materials of a nuclear weapon. An enrichment plant may be used or copied in order to produce highly enriched uranium with a U-235 content exceeding 20% for even a crude explosive device and
a content exceeding 90% for military weapons. See NUCLEAR FUELS POLICY
WORKING GROUP, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 1 NUCLEAR POWER AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION 38 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NUCLEAR FUELS]. The principal
risks associated with enrichment-beyond those associated with the transport
and use of enriched uranium-are that the enrichment plant may be modified to
produce highly enriched uranium, and the technology and practical experience
acquired in operating a legitimate enrichment facility might be used to build a
secret enrichment plant designed to produce weapons-grade uranium.
The second aspect of the fuel cycle which presents particular proliferation
risks is reprocessing and the storage of plutonium associated with the "closed"
fuel cycle. Plutonium constitutes more efficient material for building nuclear
weapons than highly enriched uranium, due to the fact that a much smaller
quantity is required for the construction of a bomb. Three principal risks result
from the introduction of a reprocessing facility. First, the facility may be diverted to use for the production of plutonium for nuclear bombs. Second, the
technology and experience gained from operating a reprocessing plant could be
used to build a secret facility whose purpose was to reprocess spent fuel in order
to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. The third risk is that the storage of
separated plutonium or spent fuel containing plutonium would permit the stockpiling of the basic material needed to build weapons. Therefore, should the need
arise, a state could seize separated plutonium stocks and proceed to build bombs
or, with only a slight delay, simply proceed to reprocess accumulated stocks of
spent fuel, thereby extracting the plutionium necessary for the construction of
nuclear weapons. Diversion of small quantities from the processing stream, of
course, is an additional risk.
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poses in commercial nuclear power programs or known research
facilities. The third strategy, political deterrence, aims to gain legal and political commitments from potential nuclear weapons
states to forego the development or testing of any nuclear explosive device.
The current non-proliferation regime includes a number of international and national mechanisms employing these three strategies in varying combinations. 15 After the first atomic bomb explosions in 1945, the United States sought to control the spread
of nuclear weapons by placing all such weapons and technology
under the control of an international agency in charge of the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It was intended that this agency possess a monopoly over the materials,
equipment, and technology needed to produce nuclear weapons.
Predictably, the Cold War prompted the Soviet Union and its allies to block the creation of such a supranational agency. The
original plan to adopt a strategy of total denial consequently
failed.'
Following the 1953 initiation of the United States "Atoms for
Peace" program by President Eisenhower, the emphasis shifted
toward a strategy of warning built upon the establishment of bilateral and international safeguards administered by the newlyformed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As the
United States possessed a virtual monopoly over existing enrichment and reprocessing technologies and the supply of enriched
uranium needed to supply light water reactors, this strategy
promised to provide the international community with timely
warning of any attempt by a country receiving nuclear equipment
and technology to divert nuclear materials from peaceful use. It
was believed that such warning would provide ample time to
bring diplomatic and other pressures to dissuade any country
from*proceeding with plans to develop nuclear weapons. Absent
the addition of independent national enrichment or reprocessing
capabilities by other nations, the strategy of warning permitted
international commerce and development in nuclear materials
and equipment for peaceful purposes. Legal commitments that
prevented the use of transferred nuclear technology for military
15.

See, e.g., J. YAGER, supra note 14, at 25-39; Nye, Maintaininga Non-

Proliferation14egime, 35 INT'L ORGANIZATION 15 (1981).
16. See, e.g., W. EPSTEIN, THE LAST CHANCE: NUCLEAR
ARMS CONTROL

1-13 (1976).

PROLIFERATION AND
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purposes were coupled with the warning component of bilateral
programs for peaceful nuclear cooperation. These commitments
were contained both in the bilateral agreements establishing programs of cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and in
the agreements placing transferred nuclear materials and equipment under the international safeguards administered by the
IAEA. These legal restraints, however, did not apply to unsafeguarded materials or equipment developed through a nation's
indigenous capabilities.
In the early 1960s an effort was made to strengthen the legal
and political commitments of non-nuclear weapons states to
forego the development, manufacture, or testing of nuclear weapons, and to place all of their nuclear activities under full-scope
safeguards. The Limited Test Band Treaty of 1963,17 the first major strengthening of the the non-proliferation regime, banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.
The Treaty was adopted primarily to curtail the spiralling nuclear
arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union and to
end the health threat represented by the radiation released in atmospheric tests; its effect was to complicate any weapons development program that might be pursued in the future by a state
seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Perhaps for this reason, the
Treaty was never ratified by the People's Republic of China or
France.
A second major advance was achieved in 1967 when the Treaty
of Tlatelolco1 8 was signed by the Latin American States. This
Treaty established a nuclear-free zone in Latin America and
banned the manufacture, testing, use, storage, or deployment of
nuclear weapons by any signatory state. It also required each signatory to negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA which
would appply to its nuclear activities 9-a requirement which presumably includes full-scope safeguards.2 0 The major shortcoming
of the Treaty was that it permitted the development and explosion of PNEs.
17. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water, done, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433,
480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter cited as Limited Test Ban Treaty].
18. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb.
14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281, reprinted in 6 INT'L LEGAL MATERiALS 521 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Treaty of Tlatelolco].
19. Id. art. 13.
20. See notes 204-08 & 226 infra and accompanying text.
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The third and most significant advance in strengthening these
legal and political commitments was the signing of the NonProliferation Treaty of 1968.21 The NPT represented a bargain
between the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons
states, by which the latter agreed to forego the manufacture or
acquisition of "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" 22 and to accept full-scope safeguards on all of their nuclear
activities 23 in exchange for certain commitments by the nuclear
weapons states. These commitments were to facilitate the exchange and development of nuclear materials, equipment, and
technology for peaceful purposes, 24 and to pursue negotiations to
end the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament.2 5
The bargain struck thus promised to end nuclear proliferation
while permitting the free development of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes in a world in which nuclear arms would play a
diminishing role.
Although ratified by the United Kingdom, the United States,
the Soviet Union, and 111 non-nuclear weapons states, 6 the NPT
has not proven to be a final solution to the problems of nuclear
proliferation. Its most obvious shortcoming has been its failure to
achieve universal adherence. A number of countries, among them
many of the threshold nuclear powers, have refused to sign the
Treaty due to its alleged discrimination between nuclear weapons
and non-nuclear weapons states. A second defect, which became
quite apparent during the 1970s, is that the spread of sensitive
nuclear technologies such as enrichment and reprocessing allows
even signatories to the NPT to develop a "near nuclear weapons
capability." In short, NPT adherence does not effectively safeguard against the sudden acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by a state which has withdrawn from the Treaty27 or vio-

21. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter cited as Non-Proliferation Treaty].
22. Id. art. 2.
23. Id. art. 3.
24. Id. art. 4.
25. Id. art. 6.
26. J. YAGER, supra note 14, at 28.
27. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 21, art. 10(1). This article provides:
Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to
withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related
to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme inter-
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lated its provisions. The Israeli bombing of the Iraqi Osirak
reactor on June 7, 1981,28 demonstrates that the other countries
may become extremely apprehensive over a state's development
of sensitive technologies, 2 regardless of that state's adherence to

the NPT.30
The weaknesses of the NPT regime became increasingly apparent in the 1970s as a result of India's underground nuclear explosion in 1974,1 an aborted French agreement to provide reprocessing to Pakistan, 2 and the 1975 agreement under which Germany
undertook to provide Brazil with both enrichment and reprocessing facilities and technologies. A number of states came to the
realization that the existing non-proliferation regime needed to be
strengthened.

33

ests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three
months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its interests.
28. See N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
29. The Osirak reactor used weapons grade uranium enriched to over 90%
U-235.
30. Iraq had ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty on March 5, 1970. See
Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 21.
31. See, e.g., J. YAGER, supra note 14, at 131-32.
32. See Betts, supra note 2, at 101-02.
33. The first such efforts were undertaken in informal meetings in which the
nuclear supplier countries participated. These first talks led to the 1974 adoption of the "Zangger Committee trigger list" of items whose export would trigger
the safeguards provided by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. See INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, I.N.F. Cmc. No. 209 (Sept. 3, 1974), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL

INSTRUMENTS

FOR NUCLEAR

TECHNOLOGY

TRANSFER

235-43 (L.

Muntzing ed. 1978). These efforts were followed by secret meetings between nuclear supplier countries beginning in 1975 which sought to develop a common
approach to the export of sensitive nuclear equipment and technology. In January 1978 this so-called "London Nuclear Suppliers" Group issued guidelines for
sensitive nuclear exports, including an expanded trigger list of exports which
would require the coverage of IAEA safeguards. Significantly, however, the
United States failed to secure acceptance of the requirement of full-scope safeguards as a condition for export of items on the trigger list. See generally 2
NUCLEAR FUELS, supra note 14, at 63-75; J. YAGER, supra note 14, at 195-99. A
number of nuclear supplier states, most notably Australia, Canada, and the
United States, decided to go further than the recommended guidelines of the
London Suppliers Group by adopting national legislation and regulations which
conditioned the continued export of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology upon acceptance by the recipient state of certain non-proliferation conditions, including full-scope safeguards covering all nuclear activities. See J.
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The existing non-proliferation regime is comprised of differing
measures and instruments adopted at different times, in divergent circumstances, and with varying purposes. These differing
regimes do not apply to all states in identical fashion. For example, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and
the NPT represent binding legal instruments, yet they do not
bind a number of potential entrants into the nuclear weapons
club. The guidelines of the London Nuclear Suppliers Group are
not legally binding, and they have occasionally been stretched
considerably in the service of important commercial interests.
The unilateral imposition of non-proliferation conditions on all
nuclear exports, as in the United States Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, is legally binding within municipal legal systems,
but may ultimately increase uncertainties regarding assurances of
supply of nuclear fuel, equipment and technology, and stimulate
the determination of threshold nuclear states to acquire the sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies needed to ensure
their nuclear independence. The present regime, therefore, does
not promise to prevent the spread of sensitive technologies,
though it may help to slow this development. It allows a number
of states to lawfully build peaceful nuclear explosive devices,
which are scientifically indistinguishable from nuclear bombs. Finally, the present regime will not prevent the development of
trade in nuclear materials and technology among states not subject to full-scope safeguards or controls on the export of sensitive
technologies.
C.

The Search for a New Consensus

At the initiative of the United States, the International Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) was launched in October 1977. 3
INFCE was established to examine the issues related to the goals
of making nuclear energy widely available to meet the world's energy requirements, on the one hand, and to minimize the risks of
nuclear proliferation, on the other. Formally, INFCE was a "technical and analytical study and not a negotiation"; 5 however,
many hoped that the results would lead to the adoption of concrete measures which would slow the spread of nuclear weapons.

YAGER, supra note 14, at 32-33, 173-81.
34. SUMMARY, supra note 14, at 260.

35. Id.
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The United States attempted to persuade INFCE participants to
forego widespread reprocessing and the introduction of breeder
reactors. By the time the Final Conference was held in February
1980, it was clear that the United States had failed to achieve this
goal. Yet progress in sensitizing other countries to proliferation
concerns was made on a number of fronts3 6 and a valuable consensus on the technological aspects of nuclear power and nonproliferation was largely achieved. During the INFCE deliberations, various forms of "internationalization" of the nuclear fuel
cycle were considered as methods of preventing sensitive materials and technology from being acquired or misused by states seeking a nuclear weapons capability. Unfortunately, most of these
schemes presented problems of great legal, economic, and technological complexity, and failed to evoke a high degree of interest
among the most significant supplier and threshold nuclear states.
One concept which did achieve broad support, however, was the
establishment of an international regime for the storage of
37
plutonium.
Following the conclusion of INFCE in February 1980, attention
shifted to the deliberations of the Expert Group on International
Plutonium Storage, which had been meeting under IAEA auspices
since 1978.8 The Expert Group hopes to develop a consensus on
an appropriate IPS regime by the end of 1982.39 The potential
36. See, e.g., Ungerer, International Nuclear Order Before and After
INFCE, 31 AUSSENPOLITIK 243, 253-55 (English ed. 1980). For a comprehensive
summary of the INFCE deliberations, see SUMMARY, supra note 14, at 1-53.
37. See, e.g., SUMMARY, supra note 14, at 45-46, 154-55.
38. For information on the current deliberation of the Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage, see EXPERT GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL PLUTONIUM
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, FIFTH MEETING (25-28 May
1981): REPORT OF THE RAPPORTEUR, IAEA Doc. IAEA-IPS/EG/114 (1981) [hereinafter cited as EXPERT GROUP]. For a sampling of the views of experts from
different countries, see id. Annexes D through S (general statements by the experts from Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, Yugoslavia, and the Commission of the European
Communities). The Chairman of the Working Group is from Brazil. Id. at 1. For
a summary of the work of the Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage, see James, InternationalPlutonium Storage, in INTERNATIONALIZATION TO
PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 143 (Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute ed. 1980). See also R. Fox & M. WILLRICH, INTERNATIONAL
STORAGE, INTERNATIONAL

CUSTODY OF PLUTONIUM STOCKS:

A

FIRST STEP TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL RE-

GIME FOR SENSITIVE NUCLEAR ENERGY ACTIvITIES

39.

EXPERT GROUP,

supra note 38, at 14.

(1978).
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benefits of an IPS regime could be highly significant. A system
removing excess stocks of separated plutonium from national control could reduce substantially the risk that such stocks would be
used to build nuclear weapons on short notice. In the light of such
protection, the reprocessing of fuel for thermal and breeder reactors arguably would proceed without creating any undue additional proliferation risk.40 Such a regime might prove particularly
desirable to countries whose nuclear development plans are currently hampered by national prohibitions contained in the national legislation of certain nuclear supplier states.41
D. The 1975 Agreement Between Brazil and the Federal
Republic of Germany on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Energy
On June 27, 1975, Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany
signed an Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Field of
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. 4 2 Under the terms of this accord

and various other subsidiary agreements, Brazil acquired the
equipment and technology necessary for the construction of the
complete nuclear fuel cycle. The Agreement and a Complementary Industrial Protocol provided for the establishment of Brazilian-German joint ventures in the following areas:
(1) exploration and development of uranium mining in Brazil, including the production of uranium concentrates; under the terms
of the agreement, once Brazil had satisfied its own requirements it
could export up to 20% of proven uranium reserves or 49% of current production to its German partner;
(2) co-development of the jet-nozzle enrichment process in Germany, and construction of a jet-nozzle enrichment facility in Brazil
with a capacity of 250,000 Separative Work Units (SWU) per year;
(3) supply of enriched uranium to Brazil until it was self-sufficient in production;
40. This would not necessarily be true, however, if an internationally protected store of plutonium were located in a country having a reprocessing
facility.
41. See, e.g., the General Statement by the Expert from France in EXPERT
GROUP, supra note 38 at Annex I, at 2.
42. Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany and Brazil Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, June 27,
1975, reprinted in G. FAHL, INTERNATIONALES RECHT DER ROSTUNGSBESCHRXNKUNG § 5.3.7.1 (1976) (German text and English translation) [hereinafter cited as Brazilian-German Agreement].
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(4) construction of a pilot reprocessing facility in Brazil to be followed by a commercial-scale reprocessing plant;
(5) construction of a factory for heavy components of nuclear
reactors;
(6) building a fuel fabrication plant in Brazil;
(7) eventual purchase by Brazil of eight 1300 KWe reactors from
Kraftwerk Union (KWU) of Germany, with an initial commitment
to buy two such reactors."'
The Brazilian-German Nuclear Agreement alarmed many opponents of nuclear proliferation in the United States and elsewhere, but the Ford Administration limited itself to mild expressions of protest. Following the 1976 election of President Carter,
United States opposition to the deal became increasingly vehement. During 1977 and 1978 the Carter Administration energetically sought to dissuade Germany from carrying through with the
Agreement. The United States also engaged in futile efforts to
persuade the Brazilians that there was no economic justification
for acquiring highly sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies. By mid-1978, however, Washington had accepted the
fact that it was powerless to block implementation of the Agreement. 4 Within the general context sketched above, the following
hypothetical Brazilian memorandum considers the two "live" policy options available to Brazil: support of an IPS regime or full
acceptance of the operative force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
II.
A.

THE HYPOTHETICAL MEMORANDUM

Economic Development, National Security and Brazil's
Future: The Framework for Decision

An examination of the policy options open to Brazil in the field
of nuclear energy requires consideration of the fundamental goals
43. The text of the Brazilian-German Agreement, supra note 42, and Complementary Industrial Protocol, are reproduced in 5 RESENHA DE POLITICA EXTERIOR DO BRASIL 156-58 (1975) (Portuguese text). See also W. ALvARs, INTRODUQXO AO DIREITO DA ENERGIA NUCLEAR 169-82 (1975); Soares, 0 acordo de
cooperagdo nuclear Brasil-AlemanhaFederal,253 REVISTA FORENSE 202, 217-21
(1976); Wonder, NUCLEAR COMMERCE AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: GERMANY
AND BRAZIL, 1975, 21 ORBIS 277, 285-90 (1977).

44. See generally K. Mmtow, LOUCURA NUCLEAR 42-47 (1979); R. WESSON,
UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL: LIMITS OF INFLUENCE 79-89 (1981); Kaiser, The
Great Nuclear Debate: German-American Disagreements, 30 FOREIGN POLICY
83, 94-100 (1978); Soares, supra note 43, at 225-27.

Tim
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of our national existence, together with the range of national interests which will be affected by any major decisions in that area.
These basic goals include the following: (1) achievement of rapid
and continuous economic development; (2) the guarantee of national security; and (3) assurance that Brazil will in the future
occupy an international position consonant with its size, population, and increasing national capabilities."
Each of these goals is intricately related to the others, for we
seek not only to increase our standard of living in absolute terms
over the next twenty-five years, but also to equal the economic
achievements of the most developed countries within fifty to one
hundred years." Similarly, we must not only safeguard our national security in the short to intermediate terms, but we must
also make decisions which will enable us to do so in seventy-five
or one hundred years. We do not use the term "national security"
in the all-inclusive sense as defined by the current "national security doctrine" of the War College; 47 we do use the term to include not only security from military attack, but also security
from interruptions in strategic supplies which could threaten or
cripple our industrial development and sharply curtail our influence in the world arena.4 s
45. By the mid-1970s, Brazil already ranked as the fifth largest country in
the world in area, the sixth largest in population (ahead of Japan), and the tenth
largest in terms of total gross national product. R. SCHNEIDER, BRAZIL: FOREIGN
POLICY OF A FUTURE WORLD POWER 1 (1976).
46. See id. at 32-33. According to a 1970 National Security Council codification of national goals, the government should ensure "the economic, social, and
political viability of Brazil as a great power" by the year 2000. C. DE MEIRA
MATTos, BRASIL: GEOPOLITICA E DESTINO (1975), quoted in R. SCHNEIDER, supra
note 45, at 53 n.1. This goal played an important part in the signing of the
Brazilian-German Agreement. See, e.g., Speech of Foreign Minister Jose de
Azevedo da Silveira, Nov. 18, 1975, reproduced in 7 RESENHA DE PoLrrIcA EXTERIOR Do BRASIL 96, 97 (1975).
47. See generally ESCOLA SUPERIOR DE GUERRA, CICLO DE CONFERENCIAS
SOBRE SEGURANPA NACIONAL (1971); see also J. BITTENCOURT, POLITICA E PODER
NACIONAL (1976); C. DE MEIRA MATTOS, A GEOPOLITICA E AS PROJE96ES DO PODER
DE CARLOS DE MEIRA MATTOS (1977); C. DE MEIRA MATTOS, GEOPOLrPICA E
DESTINO (1975).
For a rather simplified exposition of the relationship between permanent national objectives, national power, and development, all within the framework of
the National Security Doctrine, see I. RENAN, ESTUDO DE PROBLEMAS BRASILmROS: INTRODUCZo DOUTRINARIA 39-43, 45-60, 91-97 (1977).

48. Despite disagreements over the National War College's National Security
Doctrine, top Brazilian policymakers certainly share the view that "national se-
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Before Brazil can participate in a new system of "horizontal interdependence" as an equal to the major powers, it must achieve
strength through economic independence from any single nation.
Because economic development, national security, and a longterm perspective are necessary to advance Brazil into the first
rank of nations, they comprise the broad framework within which
nuclear policy issues must be decided. 49 In order to properly assess our options in the field of nuclear energy and to reach an
optimum solution, however, we must also balance our specific na-

tional interests and policy objectives.
1.

Energy Independence: The Need for Nuclear Energy

In recent years Brazil has experienced an extraordinary rate of
growth, averaging above ten percent in gross domestic product.5 0
The rate of growth in the industrial sector has reached as high as

fifteen percent.51 In order to sustain such growth, Brazil's energy
supply must grow at a greater rate as we reach higher levels of

industrialization. The decrease in industrial growth in 1976 and
1977 does not alter this assessment, for industrial recovery is
under way as evidenced by growth in the industrial sector reaching 8.5 percent in 1979.52 Growth in electrical demand is expected
to continue at a rate of twelve percent. 3 In addition, the nation's

curity is, in the final analysis, dependent on development." R. SCHNEIDER, supra
note 45, at 154.
49. See R. SCHNEIDER, supra note 45, at 32-33; Araujo Castro, The United
Nations and the Freezing of the InternationalPower Structure, 26 INT'L ORGANIZATION 158, 166 (1972); note 116 infra.
50. This was the figure given by the Brazilian government in 1975. Governo

explica alcance do acordo nuclear, 5 RESENHA DE POLICA EXTERIOR DO BRASIL
7, 9 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Governo explica]. Annual growth in gross domestic product (GDP) averaged 7.1% nationally from 1960-1979, and 4.5% per
capita during the same period. From 1968-74, real GDP grew at 11.3% per year.
Real GDP slowed to a 6% growth rate in 1978, and an estimated 6.4% in 1979.
INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN LATIN
AMERICA, 1979 REPORT 184-87 (1979). [hereinafter cited as 1979 REPORT].
51. This figure was given by the Brazilian government in 1975. Governo explica, supra note 50, at 9.
52. Growth in manufacturing output in 1979 exceeded that of the previous
year by an estimated 8.5% (8-month period of comparison). 1979 REPORT, supra
note 50, at 188.
53. See VEJA, Oct. 18, 1978, at 33. The growth in energy demand between
1974 and 1978 exceeded the estimate used to schedule the introduction of reactors. 0 Estado de Sao Paulo, Oct. 11, 1978, at 8, col. 2.
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hydroelectric potential is being intensely exploited. 4 In 1975,
when we signed the nuclear agreement with the Federal Republic
of Germany, 55 government studies suggested that this potential
would be progressively exhausted by the 1990s.5 Even considering the criticism that these studies were based on energy costs in
the late 1960s and thus seriously underrated our hydroelectric potential at current or future prices for energy, it is clear that Brazil
will need additional sources of energy by the turn of the century.57 It is estimated that our requirement for electric generating
capacity will reach seventy megawatts by 1990,"8 only ten megawatts of which will be supplied by nuclear power generation.5 1
The load factor for hydroelectric stations is only about fifty-five
percent, 0 and total generating capacity therefore should not be
confused with average available capacity. In light of the load factor, it is clear that the country must have adequate generating
capacity for thermal complementation. The drought in 1978 demonstrates that we cannot allow our industrial output to become

54. See, e.g., Redick, The Tlatelolco Regime and Non-Proliferationin Latin
America, 35 INT'L ORGANIZATION 103, 123 (1981).

55. Brazilian-German Agreement, supra note 42.
56. 0 programa nuclear brasileiro, um dossig hist6rico, 12 RESENHA DE
POLITICA EXTERIOR DO BRASIL 7, 9-10 (1977). The English translation, published
separately as "The Brazilian Nuclear Program," is reproduced in HousE COMM.
ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, OVERSIGHT OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH

AMERICA, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 89-149 (1980) (report of Congressman John W.

Wydler). A wealth of information on Brazil's energy needs and current programs
is reproduced in id. at 10-31, 82-88.
57. See K. MIROW, supra note 44, at 175-77 (1979). Mirow reports that the
purchase of eight reactors pursuant to the 1975 agreement with West Germany
was based on projected costs of $458/KWe (kilowatt) of nuclear generating capacity. Id. at 62.
Critics stress that untapped hydroelectric potential and alternative energy
sources reduce or negate the country's need for nuclear power plants. See, e.g.,
VEJA, Oct. 25, 1978, at 137-39. Current hydroelectric plant costs are less than
$1000/KWe of generating capacity, as compared to between $2,400 and $3,000!
KWe for nuclear generating capacity. Krugman, The German-BrazilianNuclear
Deal, 37 BULL. OF THE ATOM. SCIENTISTS 32, 34 (1981).
For a range of views on this issue, see SImPosio NAcIONAL DE ENERGIA,
ENERGIA

TECNOLOGIA

E

DESENVOLVIMENTO:

ENERGIA

EL CTRICA E

NUCLEAR

(1978).
58. 0 Estado de Sao Paulo, Oct. 11, 1978, at 8, col. 2.
59. Id.
60. See J. GOLDEMBERG, ENERGIA NUCLEAR NO BRASIL 57 (1978). But see
Krugman, supra note 57, at 34.

Fall19811

NUCLEAR POWER IN BRAZIL

dependent on the vagaries of nature. 1 In recent years the ratio of
hydroelectric to thermal generating capacity has reached a dangerous level of approximately ninety percent hydroelectric, ten
percent thermal.6 2 This must be redressed toward a 3target figure
of seventy percent and thirty percent, respectively.1
The astronomical increase in oil prices by OPEC beginning in
1973 and 1974 mitigates against the use of petroleum to provide
the thermal generating capacity needed by Brazil for several reasons. First, Brazil imports approximately eighty percent of its oil
and pays more than one-third of its export earnings for this item
alone.6 4 Increases in the cost of foreign oil caused Brazil to spend
more than four billion dollars on oil imports in 1978. This figure
should reach thirteen billion dollars in 1981.5 It would be foolish
to increase our dependence on foreign oil in view of the
probability of further price increases. Such action would severely
inhibit our ability to purchase foreign technology for expansion of
our industrial base, and would increase existing constraints on
our freedom of political action vis-d-vis oil-exporting nations. Second, there is considerable doubt with regard to the long-term security of our oil supplies. Events in Iran and increasing concern
over the security of shipping lanes in the South Atlantice demon61. See the statement of Mines and Energy Minister Shigeaki Ueki, Washington Post, Dec. 4, 1978, A 16, col. 4. Ueki noted that following the oil crisis the
government had let the hydro/thermal ratio slide from 70/30 to 85/15; he stated
that he considered the latter to represent an absolute minimum. Otherwise, a
drought could cause serious problems with the entire electrical system of the

country. Id.
62. In 1979, 92.3% of electricity was generated by hydroelectric plants.
MINISTERIO DAS MINAS E ENERGIA, GOVERNO FEDERATIVO Do BRASIL, BALANCE
ENERGETICo NACIoNAL 7 (1980) [hereinafter cited as BALANCE ENERGETICO].
63. See note 61 supra.
64. R. SCHNEIDER, supra note 45, at 23. In 1979, 85% of petroleum was imported at a cost estimated at $6.5 to $7.5 million. Redick, supra note 54, at 123.
Moreover, Brazilian dependence on Arabian oil has significantly constrained the
nation's foreign policy, as revealed by its votes in the United Nations General
Assembly for the "Zionism is Racism" resolution and in favor of recognition of
the Palestine Liberation Organization. See Selcher, Brazil's Multilateral Diplomacy 14-155 (1975) (unpublished State Department External Research paper).
65. 1979 REPORT, supra note 50, at 193; N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1981, at A3,
col. 1.
66. See generally G. DO COUTO E SiLvA, GEOPOLITICA DO BRASiL 225-27
(1967); V. NOBREGA, A ENERGIA NUCLEAR E SEUS CAVALOS DE TR61A 146 (1975);
Betts, Courtney, Rowen, Brody & Yager, Brazil and Argentina: Strategies for
American Diplomacy, in NON-PROLIFERATION AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 391-92
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strate this point. Finally, with proven oil reserves of only one bllion barrels (compared to sixty-one billion barrels in the United
States), Brazil cannot afford to choose an option which will permanently foreclose its prospects for energy independence.
Development of alternate sources of energy is being explored
and should be accorded a high priority, but neither solar energy
nor biomass energy can be expected to satisfy our thermal generating needs in the next fifty years.8 Although shale oil remains a
potential source of petroleum products, its utilization involves
considerable social costs while its economic viability remains uncertain.68 Petroleum products which can be produced from shale

oil will be needed in the plastics and fertilizer industries and for
purposes other than mere electric power generation. Our limited
supply of coal further complicates these matters. 9
Given the alternatives, nuclear energy remains the preferred
means for supplying the thermal generating capacity needed to
complement our hydroelectric capacity. 70 The acquisition of nuclear power generating capacity under the terms of the German
Agreement offers several important advantages. In light of recent
discoveries of uranium in Brazil-126,000 tons of proven reserves
and 89,300 tons of probable reserves totaling 215,300 tons7 1-we

(J. Yager ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Betts, Courtney]; Courtney, supra note
10, at 267.
67. Brazil planned to have one-sixth of all new cars run on alcohol alone in
1978. Dickson, Brazil's Scientists Fan Doubts Over Energy Priorities,275 NATURE 578 (1978). For information on the country's development of alternative
energy sources, see K. Mmow, supra note 44, at 206-19; BALANCE ENERGETICO,
supra note 62, at 4-10.
68. Brazil's one planned facility is tentatively scheduled to begin operation
in 1985. BALANCE ENERGETICO, supra note 62, at 72.

69. Governo explica, supra note 50, at 9. Current reserves have been estimated at twelve billion tons. K. MROW, supra note 44, at 179.
70. The development of nuclear energy is a permanent national objective of
Brazil. In December 1967 President Artur da Costa e Silva approved-a National
Security Council recoinmendation that the country's permanent national objectives include "transfer of nuclear technology to our country; obtaining in the
shortest possible time our independence in the production of nuclear fuels; creation of an infrastructure of support for the nuclear program; and formation and
training of teams competent in the different (specialized) areas." Gall, Atoms for
Brazil, Dangers for All, 23 FOREIGN POLICY 155, 186 (1976). See also R. DE BiAsI,
A ENERGIA NUCLEAR NO BRASIL 31 (1979).
71. These are as of Dec. 31, 1979 (at costs of less than $43/lb.). BALANCE
ENERGETICO, supra note 62, at 22. In 1978, 73,500 tons of proven reserves and
68,800 tons of probable reserves (total: 142,300 tons) were announced. VsJA,

Fall 19811

NUCLEAR POWER IN BRAZIL

can look forward to total self-sufficiency in fuel supplies for our
nuclear power industry, at least through the end of the century.
Moreover, given the intense exploration currently under way, 2 we
can expect a sharp increase in these figures, as suggested by the
geometric increase in reserves since 1975.73 Should breeder reactors begin operating in Brazil during the 1990s or early in the
following decade, as expected,7 4 we can look forward to total selfsufficiency in electric generating capacity far into the next century. Self-sufficiency in uranium fuel supplies will enable us to
drastically reduce the foreign exchange expended for the importation of energy supplies. The transition to an alcohol-based transport sector, coupled with increased petroleum production, could
permit us to reach self-sufficiency in oil if none of it is needlessly
diverted toward the generation of electricity. Similarly, due to our

acquisition of the complete nuclear cycle under the German
Agreement,"5 valuable foreign exchange need not be spent on the

purchase of enriched uranium or reprocessing services. Nuclear
power generation, therefore, represents the only realistic option
available to Brazil which will ensure its energy independence far
into the twenty-first century. In a world in which energy is tantamount to wealth, given the energy requirements of a highly indus-

trialized society,7 Brazil can look forward to a bright future.
Nov. 8, 1978, at 130-31. Early estimates of uranium reserves were extremely low.
In 1970, for example, it was estimated that Brazil had only 1,000 tons as opposed to 10,000 tons in Argentina. J. REDICK, MILITARY POTENTIAL OF LATIN
AMERICAN NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAMS 13, 18 (1972). By 1976, however, some

estimates reached 500,000 tons, though proven reserves amounted to only 16,500
n.5. In November 1978 the Brazilian
Congress of Geology announced that the country now had 142,300 tons of
reserves, a 1200% increase over the 1975 figure of 11,000 tons. VEJA, Nov. 8,
1978, at 130-31. These reserves were said to be sufficient to supply thirty-five
reactors for thirty years each at 70% capacity. Id.
72. See note 71 supra.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., K. MIROW, supra note 44, at 154-58.
75. See note 153 infra.
76. Compare the words of Paulo Noguiera Baptista, head of Nuclebrfis:
Projects tied to the energy sector have priority by definition. If the
problem of self-sufficiency in energy were not satisfactorily resolved, there
would be no point is establishing priorities for anything else. Without energy, there in no progress, there can be no social peace, and there will not
even be a formulation of a political plan adequate for the future of Brazil.

tons. R. SCHNEIDER, supra note 45, at 122

VEJA, Mar. 8, 1978, at 30 (translation from Portuguese).

A direct correlation between per capita gross national product and per capita
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Technology Transfer

If Brazil is to achieve parity with advanced industrialized coun-

tries such as the United States in the next fifty years, it cannot
remain dependent on foreign technology.7 7 We must broaden and

direct our own technological base toward production and exportation, rather than importation of foreign technologies. Consequently, purely economic considerations, such as the cost per kilowatt of electric generating capacity (KWe), should not by
themselves determine Brazil's choices in the field of nuclear energy. The cost of a kilowatt of nuclear generating capacity has
risen from 500 dollars to 1,600 dollars since the feasibility studies
for the German Agreement were prepared. Thus additional hydroelectric projects are feasible. (The cost of hydroelectric capacity is currently less than 1,000 dollars per kilowatt.) Nonetheless,
these considerations do not affect the desirability of proceeding
with our nuclear power program, 8 for attention should be paid to
the broader, long-term benefits to be derived from a given energy
option.7 9 In the long run, any reasonable excess over what is justifiable in terms of cost per KWe calculations will be easily recovered as a result of the increased economic bargaining power of the

nation.
In light of these considerations, the agreement signed with the
Federal Republic of Germany in 197580 constitutes an excellent

energy consumption is cited by one Brazilian authority who stresses that the
absence of adequate energy would prevent the transition of Brazil to the status
of a developed country. P. D6IA, ENERGIA NO BRASIL E DILEMAS Do DESENVOLVIMENTO 72-75, 155 (1976).
77. See note 49 supra.
78. Sharp criticisms of the nuclear program were voiced, for example, at a
National Energy Symposium held in Rio de Janeiro in October 1978. One expert
estimated the hydroelectric potential in the Amazon to be 70,000 megawatts
electric (MWe), at prices far less expensive than those for electricity generated
by nuclear power stations. See VEJA, Nov. 2, 1978, at 109. One estimate of the
eventual cost per kilowatt hour of generating capacity for the German nuclear
plants is as high as $3,000. See Atomgeschiift: Milliarden-Pleite in Brasilien?,
DER SPIEGEL, No. 38, at 124, 127 (1978). In 1978 the Brazilian government stated
that the estimate for the final cost of the Angra 11 reactor was $1,570 per kilowatt of installed capacity. This figure included many "first-time-only" items. 0
Estado de Sao Paulo, Oct. 11, at 8, col. 2.
79. See 0 Estado de Sio Paulo, Oct. 11, 1978, at 8, col. 2.
80. See note 153 infra.
For information about the trained manpower required to implement the 1975
Brazilian-German agreement, see V. TAvORA, 0 AcORDo NUCLEAR BRASIL-
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bargain. It represents the purchase of a future technological capability which will eventually enable Brazil to compete with the
most highly advanced nations in the field of nuclear energy. A few
examples should suffice to illustrate this point.
First, by acquiring its own uranium enrichment and fuel production facilities, Brazil may one day become one of the world's
major exporters of enriched uranium."' We can expect to gain
considerable influence, particularly in Latin America and other
developing countries, by providing a source of uranium supplies
82

which is not controlled by the United States or Western Europe.

Moreover, should a cartel analogous to OPEC be created for the
sale of uranium, we can expect to be economic beneficiaries rather
than victims of such a development.
Admittedly, the jet-nozzle enrichment process we are developing with the Germans has some disadvantages: (1) it is unproven
on a commercial scale, and difficult engineering problems could
arise;8 3 (2) it requires somewhat less than twice the energy needed
by the gaseous diffusion process, and almost twenty times the en-

ergy required by the gas centrifuge process; 8 4 and (3) breakthroughs in laser-separation technology in the next decade could

drastically reduce enrichment costs, thus rendering exports of

18-26 (1977).
Under the 1975 agreements, Brazil agreed to enter a joint venture with

ALEMANHA E A UNIVERSIDADE

81.

two German firms in order to develop the Becker aerodynamic jet-nozzle enrichment process, to be used in the construction of an enrichment plant. The plant
is now scheduled to begin operations by 1984. Courtney, supra note 10, at 24345. Given its own supplies of natural uranium, Brazil thus acquired the potential
to export enriched uranium, once its own needs are met. See K. Mmow, supra
note 44, at 40; Krugman, supra note 57, at 34.
82. See Courtney, supra note 10, at 258-59. A current example of willingness
to pay a "premium" for nuclear supplies and services free of political restraints
is the fact that the Soci6t6 Europfenne d'Usine de Difusion Gazeuse
(EURODIF) Triscatin Enrichment Facility in France is currently charging $140-

$150 per separative work unit (SWU), as opposed to $100-$110 currently
charged by the United States Department of Energy. Japanese and European
customers are apparently willing to pay this higher price in exchange for what
they perceive to be greater security of supply. COMM. ON GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS,
U.S. SENATE, NUCLEAR POWER DEVELOPMENT IN FRANCE 17 (1981) (report of Sen.
Charles Mathias, Jr.). For a breakdown of the ownership of EURODIF, see J.
Yager, supra note 14, at 50 n.15.
83. See, e.g., Krugman, supra note 57, at 34; K. MIRow, supra note 44, at
143-48.
84. See STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, NUCLEAR
ENERGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPON PROLIFERATION 61-62, 66 (1979).
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uranium enriched through the jet-nozzle process non-competitive
on world markets.85 However, it should be remembered that (1)
the jet-nozzle technology was the only one available for export to
Brazil;8" (2) once Brazil has an enrichment capability, it will be in
a strong position to bargain for any new laser-separation technologies, since any political (i.e., non-proliferation) reasons to thwart
such an acquisition will no longer exist; (3) our scientists will gain
valuable experience working on the jet-nozzle process at the Nuclear Research Center in Karlsruhe, Germany, and later in. Brazil;8 7 and (4) we shall own the process jointly with the Germans,

and will be in a position to benefit from both technological advances and at least some long-term export possibilities. 8
Second, by proceeding with the construction of a pilot reprocessing plant, Brazil will avoid falling further behind in the commercial development of reprocessing. Only by the immediate development of a reprocessing system can we guarantee sufficient fuel
supply for our breeder reactors. This advancement should enable
Brazil to compete internationally in the sale of reprocessing services which could become a significant source of export earnings.8 9
Finally, having acquired the national capacity to manufacture
all of the components of nuclear reactors, Brazil will maintain a
capacity to export not only enriched or reprocessed uranium, but
also entire nuclear reactor systems and parts.90 This export capa85. Id.
86. Courtney, supra note 10, at 244. Indeed, one should note that the Bech-

tel Corporation was forced to withdraw its offer to build an enrichment plant in
Brazil following consultation with the United States Department of State in the
spring of 1975. Betts, Courtney, supra note 66, at 378-80. Moreover, West Germany was unable to transfer gas centrifuge technology to Brazil because of the
unwillingness of its partners in URENCO to go along. See Courtney, supra note
10, at 244.
87. See Assinatura do acordo 6 anunciada no Senado, 5 RESENHA DE PoLrrICA EXTERIOR DO BRASIL 19, 22 (1975); R. DE BIAsi, supra note 70, at 93 (1979).
88. Courtney, supra note 10, at 244.

89. Reprocessing coupled with introduction of fast breeder reactors (FBRs)
could stretch uranium supplies by a factor of up to 100. Reprocessing also results in a savings of 20-25% in separative work units required for enrichment.
Opponents of reprocessing often downplay these facts and focus upon the sav-

ings in uranium in the next twenty years; the period before breeders are expected to come on stream. See, e.g., Nye, Non-Proliferation:A Long-Term
Strategy, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 601, 608-09 (1978).
90. See Courtney, supra note 10, at 273. This hope may be unrealistic, given

excess capacity in the industry and the nature of the competition. Id. at 245,
273, 278.
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bility will be particularly important within South America and
Africa.9 1
3.

Military Security

Military security represents a national interest second to none
in importance.92 The response of Brazil to non-proliferation pressures from abroad could have a significant impact on our military
posture and capabilities in the future. Consequently, in evaluating the various military options of Brazil, the following considera-

tions should be kept in mind. First, Brazil currently enjoys clear
conventional military superiority in South America.9 3 In addition,
we are rapidly moving towards self-sufficiency in arms production. 4 Second, Brazil has no territorial disputes with any of its
neighbors 95 and, therefore, there are no potential causes of military conflict such as exist between Argentina and Chile,9 6 and
91. R. SCHNEIDER, supra note 45, at 105 n.13.
92., For an overview of Brazilian strategic interests, see the classic formulation, G. DO COUTO

E

SILVA, ASPECTOS GEoPoLrrlCos

DO

BRASIL (1957).

93. R. SCHNEIDER, supra note 45, at 3. Although devoting only 2.21% of its
gross national product to defense, Brazil had the nineteenth largest military
budget in the world in 1975, three times that of Argentina. Gorman, Recent
Threats to Peace in South America: The TerritorialDimensions of Conflict, 33
INTER-AMERIcAN ECON. AFF. 51, 65 (1979).
94. See Courtney, supra note 10, at 268-69. Brazil is producing increased
amounts of all but the most sophisticated arms, including armored personnel
carriers and the "Xavante" jet fighter-trainer. It also plans to build destroyers
and submarines. Id.
95. Courtney, supra note 10, at 241, 253. Brazil owes its absence of territorial
disputes to the far-sighted statesmanship of individuals such as Ruy Barbosa,
who played a leading role in the drafting of the first republican Constitution on
February 24, 1891, which included provisions for the settlement of disputes by
negotiations or arbitration, and forbidding wars of conquest. See B. BURNS, A
HISTORY OF BRAZIL 289 (2d ed. 1980); M. SEGURADO, O DEREITO NO BRASIL 428
(1973). With this constitutional mandate, Brazil's brilliant diplomat and foreign
minister, the Baron of Rio Branco, proceeded through negotiations and arbitration to successfully establish the final delimitation of the country's frontier in
only fifteen years (1895-1909). B. BURNS, supra at 321-23.
The provisions of the 1891 constitution referred to above are retained in the
current Constitution of Brazil, establishing a high standard that other states
might well emulate: "International disputes shall be settled by direct negotiations, arbitration, or other peaceful means, with the cooperation of the international agencies in which Brazil participates. War of conquest is forbidden." CONSTITUIg O art. 7 (Brazil 1967, as amended 1969), reprinted in ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES, CONSTITUTIONS OF MEMBER STATES (English translation).
96. See Courtney, supra note 10, at 261-62, 266-67. Tensions between Argen-
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among the Andean countries.9 Though tensions could continue
with Paraguay or Argentina over the Itaipu Dam98 and hydroelectric development in the River Plata Basin, 99 such disputes certainly would not be of the type that can lead to war. 100 Therefore,
our neighbors lack any conceivable motive to precipitate a military conflict. 10 Third, Brazil is a beneficiary of the non-proliferation regime established by the NPT 0 2 and the Treaty of
Tlatelolco. 103 All of our neighbors except Argentina and Chile are
legally prohibited from developing nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.104 Should the non-proliferation regime
come unraveled and countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, or
Venezuela obtain nuclear weapons, the military security of Brazil
would suffer a net decrease. Thus, obviously it will be to our adtina and Chile reached a peak in 1978 when Argentina mobilized its forces in the
south and almost pushed the dispute to war. See id.; note 97 infra.
97. Regarding territorial disputes between Argentina and Chile (Beagle
Channel Islands); between Chile, Bolivia, and Peru; and between Peru and Ecuador, see Gorman, supra note 93, at 53-64. In December 1978, following Argentine rejection of an arbitral award, the two countries reached the brink of war as
100,000 Argentine and 45,000 Chilean troops mobilized along the border in the
South, as did the naval forces of the two countries in the vicinity of the diputed
islands. Fortunately, the crisis was defused by the timely intervention of the
Vatican. See Note, The Beagle Channel Affair: A Failure in JudicialPersuasion, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 971, 971-74 (1979). In early 1981, Ecuador and
Peru fought a brief border war over a disputed area along the Marafion River.
See N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1981, at 2, col. 4; id., Jan. 30, 1981, at 6, col. 3 (Ecuador
asks intervention of Organization of American States); id., Feb. 3, 1981, at 3, col.
2 (foreign ministers of Organization of American States meet); id., Feb. 8, 1981,
§ 4, at 4, col. 2 (review of conflict).
98. See Courtney, supra note 10, at 241-42, 266. For a Brazilian view of the
problems in the River Plata Basin, see A. MELLO, 0 BRASIL E A BACIA DO PRATA
(1980).
99. See Courtney, supra note 10, at 253.
100. Id. at 242, 26i. Neither country, for example, seriously threatened military action even at the height of the Itaipu dam controversy. Id. at 266; cf.
Treverton, Latin America in World Politics:The Next Decade, in THE ADELPM
PAPERs, ARTICLE No. 137, at 38 (1977) (substantial military confrontation between Brazil and Argentina in the near future is "extremely unlikely").
101. See Courtney, supra note 10, at 242. Brazil and Argentina have no motive to fight a conventional war. This is not to say, however, that Brazil could
under all circumstances avoid becoming involved in a major conflict between, for
example, Argentina and Chile. See Gorman, supra note 93, at 66-67.
102. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 21.
103. See note 18 supra.
104. See Courtney, supra note 10, at 254-57.
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vantage if the non-proliferation regime continues in effect.
Fourth, given our conventional military power, Brazil has no continental incentive to construct nuclear weapons as long as no
other South American country acquires such a capability. 105 Argentina is not under full-scope safeguards,108 and it uses a technology which lends itself to diversion of irradiated fuel rods containing plutonium, 10 7 raising the question of whether that country
may be seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.108
Though foreign perceptions of an Argentine-Brazilian race to
build nuclear weapons are often exaggerated,10 9 the question deserves serious consideration.

Argentina could decide to construct nuclear weapons for various reasons: (1) a desire to counter the perceived threat of Brazil-

ian economic and political influence in the rest of South America,
105. Id. at 261, 277-78. A major military conflict between Chile and Argentina could create strong incentives to develop such a capability. See id. at 27778. Moreover, Brazil's security is further enhanced because all of its neighbors
except Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana are signatories to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, entered into force Dec. 3, 1948, 21
U.N.T.S. 77. There may be some doubt as to the continued effectiveness of the
treaty, however, in view of the failure to apply its provisions to the Beagle Channel dispute and the February 1981 conflict between Peru and Ecuador.
106. Courtney, supra note 10, at 247-50.
107. Heavy water reactors (HWRs) use natural uranium and do not need to
be shut down for refueling. The proliferation risk increases because there is no
need for enrichment. The insertion and removal of fuel elements in violation of
international safeguards is more difficult to detect as a result of continuous operation. Finally, Argentina has been building its own unsafeguarded, heavywater production plant which is scheduled to go into operation in 1981.
Courtney, supra note 10, at 247-49, 275. In late 1979 Argentina granted a contract to Sulzer, a Swiss firm, for the construction of a $300 million demonstration plant for the production of heavy water. A significant factor in the choice of
the Swiss firm was that, unlike the Canadian competition, the Swiss did not
insist on "full-scope" safeguards as a condition of the transaction (the Canadian
bid was reported to be 30% lower than the Swiss bid). Id. at 248-49. Although
Swiss technology will be under the same type of "replication" safeguards as that
transferred under the Brazilian-German agreement, id. at 249, the same types of
problems in interpreting such restrictions are likely to occur. See note 155 infra.
108. J. GOLDEMBERG, supra note 60, at 39, 76 (1978); see Waisman, Incentives for Nuclear Proliferation:The Case of Argentina, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND THE NEAR-NucLEAR COUNTRIES 279 (0. Marwah & A. Schulz eds. 1975).
109. See, e.g., Lowrance, Nuclear Futures for Sale, in INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING 201, 201 (A. Chayes & W. Lewis
eds. 1977). See also M. SCENNA, ARGENTINA-BRAsiL: CUATRO SIGLOS DE RIvALmAD
(1975).
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through acquisition of the presumed prestige and bargaining
power accruing to a nuclear weapons state; (2) compensation for
Brazil's conventional military strength in order to avoid falling
into the situation of perceived military vulnerability; (3) fear that
Brazil may be developing nuclear weapons, and a determination
to preclude Brazil from acquiring a unilateral nuclear weapons
advantage; (4) a decision to acquire a nuclear capability in order

to be in a position of military dominance in any future disputes
with Chile, or in any military confrontation involving Peru, Bo-

livia, and Chile; 110 or (5) an attempt by one faction of the military

to gain influence within the government by adopting a hardline
posture and controlling development and deployment of nuclear
weapons.""

110. Argentina's bellicose attitude in the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile
gives cause for reflection. See Courtney, supra note 10, at 261-62.
111. Argentina's perceptions of Brazil's intentions and capabilities are likely
to have a considerable impact on Argentina's own decisions. The following statement in an Argentine military journal in 1975 is particularly revealing in this
connection:
Given the available facts, it is possible to affirm that (Brazil) has taken
the firm decision to join the Nuclear Club, that is, to make an atom bomb
under the concept of peaceful uses ....

The decision to manufacture

the nuclear explosive and the opportunity are critical for Argentina,
since our neighbor's nuclear device, without a counterpoise, will affect
our security palpably and decidedly. (Emphasis in the original.)
J. Guglialmelli, Y si Brasil fabrica la bomba at~mica?, ESTRATEGIA MAY 1975 at
13-14, quoted in Gall, supra note 70, at 188-89. See also J. GUGLIALMELLI, ARGENTINA, BRASIL Y LA BOMBA AT6MICA (1976); d' Adesky, Brazil's Rise to Domi-

nance in Latin America, 3 FLETCHER FORUM 46, 48 (1979). For an indirect suggestion from one of the chief defenders of the Brazil's nuclear program that the
acquisition of an eventual nuclear weapons capability was one of the benefits of
the 1975 German accord, see V. NOBREGA, supra note 66, at 224-25:
Other countries like France and India, were able to enter the nuclear field
and build their atomic bombs. Thus, Brazil, upon entering the atomic era
and considering her pacifist tendencies, which have been more than amply
demonstrated in the course of history, acquired a greater capability to halt
the expansion of Marxist imperialism-which is indispensable to provide
for the security of the State, and hence the climate of tranquility, progress
and peace for which we all yearn.
Such perceptions were certainly not diluted by a comment in an official Brazilian military journal that, "a simple agreement like Itaipu would be impossible if
one of our neighbors had 20 kilos of plutonium." de Castro, A Energia Nuclear
no Brasil, A DEFESA NAcioNAL, Jan.-Feb. 1974, at 63, quoted in Gall, supra note
70, at 184.
Argentina has in the past possessed an unsafeguarded reprocessing facility,
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Brazil presently has no extra-continental motive for developing
nuclear weapons. Whether this will continue to be the case turns
largely upon whether the nuclear weapons states attempt to
freeze the international power structure, and on the type of world
order, including economic arrangements, which develops in the
next fifty to one hundred years." 2 Should vertical proliferation
continue unabated while nuclear powers use their nuclear military
advantage as an economic and political weapon, 1 3 it would be de-

and a recent decision to proceed with the construction of a new one raises questions. See Courtney, supra note 10, at 249-50; Redick, Regional Restraint: U.S.
Nuclear Policy and Latin America, 22 ORBIS 161, 167 (1978); Benjamin, Nations Thinking Nuclear Worry About Neighbors, Washington Post, Dec. 8,
1978, at A16, col. 1.
While Argentina publicly maintains it is not worried about Brazil obtaining
nuclear weapons, officials have privately defended their decision to construct an
experimental reprocessing plant on the grounds that Brazil will do likewise, and
they cannot allow Brazil to get ahead in nuclear technology. Washington Post,
Dec. 8, 1978, at A16, col. 1. During his visit to Brazil in November 1978, Secretary of State Vance reportedly transmitted to his hosts an Argentine message
that if Brazil were to proceed with reprocessing, Argentina would do likewise.
VEJA, Nov. 30, 1978, at 20, 23. With respect to Argentine intentions regarding
the development of nuclear weapons, and early indications this was a strong possibility, see J. REDICK, supra note 71, at 15-17. Moreover, it should be noted that
unlike Brazil, Argentina has never ratified the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty. J.
REDICK, supra note 71, at 71; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 320
(1981); Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra, note 17.
In May, 1980, Brazil and Argentina concluded agreements for cooperation in
the field of nuclear energy, including cooperation in research on reactors, exchanges of nuclear materials, uranium prospecting, and the manufacture of fuel
elements. See Courtney, supra note 10, at 258; Redick, supra note 54, at 129-33.
While this agreement could help to moderate fears, should Argentina develop
nuclear weapons Brazil would desire to do likewise. See Courtney, supra note
10, at 277-78; Treverton, supra note 100, at 41-45.
112. The following statement by a leading Brazilian strategist indicates that
adverse developments in Africa could affect more than the security of shipping
lanes and oil supplies:
[T]he moment that a military power hostile to Brazil occupies the Atlantic
coast of Africa, at any point-from Morocco to South Africa-we will begin to feel a climate of uneasiness and of war-like pressure in our country
without precedent in our history. That is because, today, even a base of
intermediate-range rockets installed on the West African salient could easily threaten a long strip of our Northeast bulge.
C. DE MEIRA MATTOS, BRASIL: GEOPOLITICA E DESTINO (1975), quoted in R.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 45, at 75.
113. See H. MULLER, ENERGIEPOLITIK, NUKLEAREXPORT UND DIE WEITERVERBREITUNG VON KERNWAFFEN 15-16 (1978). Failure to make real progress on the
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sirable for Brazil to acquire the technological capability to produce nuclear weapons. If the world situation were then to deteriorate, Brazil would be in a strong position to defend itself and to

bargain in economic and political arenas."" A desirable strategy
to maximize Brazil's military security would include the following
elements: (1) acquisition of the technological base required to

halting of vertical proliferation (i.e., quantitative and qualitative increases in the
nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapons states) has been severely criticized by
non-nuclear weapons states. During his visit to West Germany in March 1978,
Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel responded to United States pressure for Brazil to forego reprocessing by calling for "an urgent cessation of the arms race,
above all in the nuclear area." VFJA, Mar. 15, 1978, at 16. The Non-Proliferation
Treaty provides in article 6: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a
treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 21, art. 6. Non-compliance
with article 6 was the focal point of the deep divisions between the nuclear
weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons states at the 1975 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. See W. EPSTEIN, RETROSPECTIVE ON THE NPT
REVIEW CONFERENCE: PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE (1975); 1 M. SHAKER, THE NuCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 447-70 (1980); STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL

PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE NPT: THE MAIN POLITICAL BARRIER TO NuCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION 10-12, 34-38 (1980) [hereinafter cited as SIPRI].
Moreover, Yugoslavia threatened to withdraw from the NPT regime because of
the attitude of the United States and the Soviet Union on implementation of
art. 6. H. MOLLER, supra at 16. For a summary of the 1980 Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review Conference, see U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
1980 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NuCLEAR WEAPONS (1980).
The failure of the United States to ratify the SALT H Treaty has clearly
deepened the dissatisfaction of the non-nuclear weapons states over the failure
to implement article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A basic contradiction
exists between the great priority given to the development of nuclear forces by
the United States and the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and their insistence
that non-nuclear weapons states permanently forego the development of such
weapons. These nuclear powers do not recognize that the actions they take,
based on the presupposition that military and nuclear power will be decisive in
resolving disputes, have a profound impact on policy makers in non-nuclear
weapons states. See generally H. MOLLER, supra at 17, 36-37, 49.
114. Brazil has the most advanced rocket program in Latin America. After
collaborating closely with West Germany, over 400 rockets had been launched
by 1972. J. REDICK, supra note 71, at 24-25. In addition, its air force is the most
advanced in Latin America. Rosenbaum, Brazil's Nuclear Aspirations, in NuCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND THE NEAR-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES 255, 265. (0. Marwah
& A. Schulz eds. 1975).
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build nuclear weapons, as a hedge against a breakdown in the
non-proliferation regime or adverse developments in the evolution of the international economic and political order; (2) maintenance of a capability to use sufficient plutonium or highly enriched uranium to exercise the nuclear weapons option within a
relatively short time of perhaps one to two years should such adverse developments occur;" 5 and (3) contribution to international
efforts to maintain and strengthen the non-proliferation regime in
order to avoid the medium or long-term spread of nuclear
weapons.
4. Building a New International Order: International Relations
Based on Non-Discrimination and Mutual Respect
To achieve its fundamental goal of occupying a position among
the world's nations which corresponds to its size, population, and
increasing national capabilities, Brazil must continue its efforts to
avoid a freezing of the international power structure. Indeed, it
must attempt to "thaw" the rigidities which currently exist."' All
foreign policy actions consequently must be examined in terms of
whether they reinforce the discriminatory tendencies of the pre115. For the suggestion that Brazil is indeed pursuing the nuclear weapons
option, see note 111 supra and accompanying text; Klein, Lasst uns doch die
Atombombe Fassen!, in DAS DEUTSCH-BRASILUMSCHE ATOMGESCHAPr 29-36 (2d
rev. ed. 1977).
116. See Araujo Castro, supra note 49; Araujo Castro, 0 Congelamiento do
Poder Mundial, 33 REvISTA BRASILEIRA DE ESTUDOS POLITICOS 7-30 (1972).
Araujo Castro, a former foreign minister who served as Brazil's Ambassador to
the United Nations from 1967 to 1975, repeatedly cited the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty of 1968 as the key to the nuclear powers' attempt to freeze
the current international power structure. R. SCHNEIDER, supra note 45, at 104
n.8. See also 47/48 BOLETIM DA SOCIEDADE BRASILEIRA DE DIREITO INTERNACIONAL
95-97 (1968) (aide-memoire delivered by Brazilian government to Latin American foreign ministries in April of 1968); Rosenbaum & Cooper, Brazil and the
Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty, 46 INT'L AFF. 74 (1970)
Foreign Minister Azevedo da Silveira stressed this point in a speech given on
November 18, 1975, on the occasion of the entry into force of the BrazilianGerman Agreement:
After careful evaluation of the potentialities of our cooperation,we have
both reached the conclusion that, in the world of today, only the courage
to innovate and to make bold will permit us to break the vicious circle
which condemns nations to an internationalsocial stratification,with the
growing problems and inevitable dangers which attend it.
7 RESENHA DE POLITICA ExTERIOR DO BRASIL 96 (1975) (emphasis in original)
(translated from Portuguese). See also J. REDICK, supra note 71, at 27-38.
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sent international economic and political order, or rather contribute to an increasing fluidity in the various international "games"
in which nations compete for wealth, power, and influence. To accede to unilateral demands based on threats such as those implicit in the United States Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978117 would be to weaken Brazil's credibility and capacity for
coalition-building among both developing and developed nations.
The acceptance of weighted voting formulas would similarly
weaken Brazil's drive for more equitable voting procedures in international fora such as the United Nations Security Council.
5. The Maintenance of Good Relations with Both Developing
and Industrialized Nations
Brazil must maintain good relations with the broadest possible
range of nations, including the developing countries, in order to
maximize its independence and freedom of action, and to promote the gradual restructuring of the international economic and
political order. In the nuclear area, good relations should contribute to a significant export market for enriched uranium, reprocessing services, and eventually nuclear reactors and parts. Similarly,
healthy relations with the industralized countries are of vital importance in order to secure strong sources of technology, capital
imports, and private investment. Industrialized nations also provide markets for manufactured as well as traditional exports. The
following examples illustrate the importance of harmonious relations with countries possessing nuclear power.
(a) Federal Republic of Germany
West Germany is of obvious importance"' in view of our 1975
agreement for the acquisition of technology for the full nuclear
fuel cycle. 119 Under a subsidiary agreement, Germany has further
117. See, e.g., Hildenbrand, A German Reaction to U.S. Non-Proliferation
Policy, 3 INT'L SECURITY 5 (1978); Williams, The United States Congress and
Non-Proliferation,3 INT'L SECURITY 45 (1978); notes 141-45 infra and accompanying text.
118. On Brazilian-West German relations in general, see W. GRABENDORFF &
M. NITSCH, BRASILIEN: ENTWICKLUNGSMODELL UND AUSSENPOLITIK (1977); C. VON
DOELLINGER, A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: THE BRAZILIAN-

GERMAN CASE (1979).
119. German-Brazilian relations in the nuclear field were underway well

before the signing of the 1975 accord. Following the National Security Council
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undertaken to supply Brazil with enriched uranium, produced in
URENCO, 120 for our power reactors until national production
meets our needs. This is of critical importance for the fuel supply
for the Angra II and III reactors,12 1 and would be equally important for Angra I should the United States decide to renege on its
obligations. In addition, the politicization of the world uranium
market, brought about chiefly by the United States,122 will make
Brazil an even more attractive source of natural uranium. Under
our agreements with the Federal Republic, Brazil will supply Germany with twenty percent of its uranium production in excess of
resolution in October 1967, which established an independent nuclear energy capability as a permanent national objective, Brazil and Germany signed a scientific and technological cooperation agreement on June 9, 1969, and Brazil's National Nuclear Energy Commission entered into a cooperation agreement with
Germany's Jfilich Nuclear Research Center in April 1971. R. SCHNEIDER, supra
note 45, at 91-92. Under the 1969 agreement, there was speculation that Brazil
and West Germany were to cooperate in research on the gas centrifuge enrichment process. J. REDICK, supra note 71, at 20-24. Earlier efforts by Brazil in
1953 to acquire three prototype gas ultrafuges for uranium enrichment from
West Germany were blocked by United States occupation authorities. R.
SCHNEIDER,

supra note 45, at 48-49.

For an overview of German nuclear policies and the economic and political
considerations which support them, see H. MULLER, supra note 113; Hickel,
West Germany's Nuclear Export Policy, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 39-64 (J. Park ed. 1979); Hildenbrand, Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Exports, and the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons, in INTERNATIONALIZATION: AN ALTERNATIVE TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 83-107 (1980); von
Preuschen, Nichtverbreitungspolitik und Nuklearexport, 23 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr 741-44 (1977).
120. 5 RESENHA DE POLITICA EXTERIOR DO BRASH 19, 22 (1975).
121. The Angra I and Angra II reactors are scheduled to begin operation
before Brazil's production of enriched uranium (made possible by the 1975

agreement with Germany) is adequate to satisfy its fuel requirements. Principal
factors behind Brazil's agreement with Germany were the temporary suspension
by the United States Atomic Energy Agency of all new enrichment services contracts on December 8, 1972; the Agency's replacement of requirements contracts
with fixed commitment contracts in September 1973; and in June 1974, the
Agency's suspension of the signing of all new contracts for future supplies of
enriched uranium, and retroactive classification as conditioning on available capacity of enrichment services contracts for forty-five foreign reactors, including
two in Brazil. Coupled with the disruption in oil supplies during and after the
Middle East war in October 1973, these actions deepened Brazil's sense of insecurity regarding future supplies of enriched uranium. Franko, U.S. Regulation

of the Spread of Nuclear Technologies Through Supplier Power: Lever or
Boomerang?, 10 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 1181, 1183-94 (1978).
122. See generally Franko, supra note 121.
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that needed for national consumption.123
(b) France
The maintenance of good relations with France is of great importance to our nuclear program because of our agreement (concluded shortly after the German deal) to proceed with joint development of the COBRA fast breeder reactor.12 The advanced
nuclear technology supplied by France will help reduce our long1 25

term dependence on the West Germans.

(c)

United States

Despite present difficulties, good relations with the United
States are of obvious importance for Brazil. In 1978 United States
banks held between four and one-half and six billion dollars in
Brazilian debts; 126 further, these banks are a vital source of the
foreign investment needed to finance our industrial growth. At
the same time, open access to United States markets for our manufactured products is highly desirable. The United States represents a valuable source of advanced technology in alternate
energy fields and in the oil industry. We are at least ten years
behind the United States in the development of solar energy, and
we could benefit from the developing technology for the extraction of shale oil. In the future, Brazil will also desire access to
fusion technology, in which the United States is quite advanced.
It is desirable for nuclear energy in Brazil that the United
States comply with its commitment under our 1972 cooperation
agreement to supply up to 12,300 kilograms of U-235 uranium for
Angra J.127 Although no longer essential in view of our agreement
123. VEJA, Nov. 8, 1978, at 130-31.
124. R. SCHNEIDER, supra note 45, at 116.
125. Brazil's cooperation with France began as early as May 1967 with a nuclear cooperation agreement between the two nations, which included research
on thorium reactors, and apparently on gas centrifuge enrichment as well. See J.
REDICK, supra note 71, at 20.
126.

Figures were reported in VEJA, Mar. 29, 1978, at 22. In 1981 the United

States reportedly held $16 billion in loans to Brazil, and another $7 billion in
investments. U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST IN LATIN AMERICA: HEARINGS BEFORE THE
SUBCOMM. ON INTER-AMERIcAN AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AF-

97th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1981) (statement of Constantine C. Menges).
127. Agreement Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, July 17, 1972,
United States-Brazil, 23 U.S.T. 2477, T.I.A.S. No. 7439 arts. VII-IX [hereinafter
cited as 1972 Cooperation Agreement]. United States restrictions on the supply
FAIRS,
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with Germany, an overabundance of assured supplies of uranium
would be advantageous in view of the chaotic nature of the world
market. More important than fuel supplies, however, would be access to advanced technology, including waste disposal technology
developed under the United States military program and laserseparation enrichment technology,12 which could prove much
cheaper than our jet-nozzle process. The provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978,129 however, severely inhibit
our access to United States nuclear technology. In fact, the Act
could threaten our supply of URENCO-produced fuel from West
Germany. 130 It is thus in our long-term interest to reach an accommodation with the United States.
6.

Optimal Impact of Energy Choices on Brazil's Balance of
Payments

A fifteen billion dollar cost for acquisition of full fuel-cycle
technology and eight 1300 KWe reactors by 1990 is certainly not
excessive compared to Brazil's present expenditure of some thirteen billion dollars a year for oil imports. 1 1 These costs eventually would be recovered through exports of uranium, reprocessing
services, reactors and parts, and reduced oil imports. Moreover,
seventy-five percent of these sums for construction would be
spent in Brazil. 132 Nonetheless, competing capital imports, foreign
debt service, and an adverse trade balance could pose short-term
of nuclear fuel to Angra I and perceived violation by the United States in July
1974 of a long-term commitment to supplying nuclear fuel for the Angra H and
III reactors contributed directly to the search for alternate sources which ultimately resulted in the 1975 German-Brazilian accord (and rejection of Westinghouse reactors for Angra H and III). The ability to withhold fuel elements from
Brazilian reactors, once they have begun to supply a significant portion of the
nation's electricity, could pose a serious threat to the nation's economy. See R.
SCHNEMER, supra note 45, at 50-51, 92.
128. See K. MIROW, supra note 44, at 148 (Brazil's potential interest in laserseparation technology).

129. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3282 (Supp. HI 1979); see note 117 supra.
130. See note 145 infra.
131. See notes 64 & 65 supra.
132. In October 1978 the government estimated that the cost of constructing
all eight reactors under the agreement with West Germany would be $15 billion.
VEA, Oct. 18, 1978, at 33. See also VEJA, Nov. 8, 1978, at 35; 0 Estado de S~o
Paulo, Oct. 11, 1978 at 8, col. 1. Since 1978, however, estimates have continued
to soar, and it is now believed that the total cost may reach $30 billion. Redick,
supra note 54, at 124.
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difficulties, 1' 3 in which case the timetable could be extended and,
if necessary, the total number of reactors could be reduced (Brazil
was originally obligated to buy only two).' 3 ' If possible, however,

the full complement of reactors should be purchased in order to
maintain a healthy working relationship with the West Germans.
7. Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
Beyond the purely military considerations discussed above,
Brazil has a strong interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear
weapons. A breakdown in the non-proliferation regime would require Brazil to divert scarce resources from economic development to the development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The international breakdown which might then ensue
would require other military expenses as well. Horizontal nuclear
proliferation would dim prospects for halting vertical proliferation, increase the importance of military as opposed to economic
power in political bargaining, and make it much more difficult for
Brazil to achieve its fundamental national goals.
B. Establishment of an InternationalDepositary for
Separated Plutonium
The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which began in October 1977 and concluded in February 1980,' s3 examined
issues related to the availability of nuclear energy to meet the
world's urgent energy requirements, and the mitigation of the
dangerous spread of nuclear weapons. INFCE was divided into
eight working groups. Working Group Four was charged with the
task of evaluating issues concerning reprocessing, plutonium handling, recycling in thermal reactors, and special needs of developing countries.
After examining various aspects of a possible International Plutonium Storage regime, Working Group Four reported that the
IAEA Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage was continuing its discussions regarding the establishment of such a re133. See Atomgeschdft: Milliarden-Pleite in Brasilien?, DER SPIEGF., No.
38, at 124 (1978); 0 Estado de S~o Paulo, Oct. 11, 1978, at 8, col. 2.
134. T. WINKLER, DIE NUKLEARPOLITIK DER SCHWELLENMACHTE 41 (1980).
135. For a complete summary of International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation proceedings and findings, see SUMMARY, supra note 14. See also notes 34-37

supra and accompanying text.
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gime. The following issues were under consideration:
the location of stores; the form in which plutonium should be
stored; the management and operation of stores; the conditions
that should be attached to its release; the legal basis for the
scheme; and what form the scheme's controlling body should take
and what powers it should have .... IsO
Working Group Four concluded:
International Plutonium storage appears an attractive proposition
because it could co-exist with all of the other institutional models
described (i.e., other international arrangements) and it would reduce the proliferation risks of one of the sensitive features of
reprocessing and recycling.
Assurance of supply of plutonium could be enhanced by the introduction of IPS, if it secured international agreement on universally applicable and non-discriminatory conditions, accepted by
participants for the release and use of plutonium. In addition,
IAEA involvement could increase international confidence in the
system .... 137
Deliberations on the establishment of an IPS regime are now continuing within the framework of the IAEA Expert Group on In138
ternational Plutonium Storage.
Brazil has participated in INFCE and is currently participating
in the deliberations of the Expert Group on IPS, which is expected to reach agreement on a draft ITS regime by the end of
1982.139 Consequently, Brazil must determine which type of IPS
regime it would be willing to support.
1. National Interests: A Recapitulation
The immediate question confronting Brazil is what general attitude should be adopted in the Expert Group on IPS during these
continuing discussions. It is by no means certain that any international depositary for plutonium would be acceptable to us, although it is possible that a certain type of scheme could offer advantages through the simultaneous reduction of non-proliferation
136. INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FuEL CYCLE EVALUATION, REPROCESSING, PLUTONIUM HANDLING, RECYCLING 180-81 (1980).

137. Id. at 185. See also id. at 165-66, 188, 212; SUMMARY, supra note 14, at

43, 45-46, 48, 155.
138.
139.

See notes 38-41 supra and accompanying text.
See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
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pressures and shoring up of the non-proliferation regime.
Moderate benefits could accrue from the establishment of a depositary satisfactory to Brazil. First, under the terms of the
United States Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978,140 no plutonium transferred or produced through any facility pursuant to
any new agreements for cooperation in the field of atomic energy
"will be stored in any facility that has not been approved in advance by the United States." ' The statute mandates that the
President immediately commence efforts to renegotiate existing
cooperation agreements (e.g., the 1972 agreement with Brazil)14 2
in order to incorporate this new standard 143 and to "vigorously
seek to obtain the application of such [new] provisions" with respect to nuclear materials and equipment already contracted for
under preexisting agreements (e.g., the contract to supply enriched uranium to Angra I pursuant to the 1972 Brazilian-United
States cooperation agreement).14 ' United States approval is also
required whenever Brazil imports such materials or equipment
from a third state with which the United States has successfully
renegotiated a corresponding cooperation agreement. 14" The establishment of an international depositary for plutonium would
remove t least this issue from contention, while perhaps contributing to international pressures for repeal of other objectionable
provisions in the Act.
Second, and far more important, the establishment of an international depositary for plutonium would satisfy the condition included, at Dutch insistence in our September 1978 agreement for
the supply of enriched uranium from URENCO. 146 Under the
terms of a 1975 agreement with West Germany, such uranium will

140. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3282 (Supp. III 1979).
141. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 123(a)(8), as amended by Nuclear NonProliferation Act of 1978 § 401, 42 U.S.C. § 2153(a)(8) (Supp. III 1979).
142. See Agreement for Application of Safeguards, July 27, 1972, International Atomic Energy Agency-United States-Brazil, 23 U.S.T. 2526, T.I.A.S. No.
7440 [hereinafter cited as Tripartite Agreement]; note 127 supra.
143. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 117; Bettauer, The Nuclear NonProliferationAct of 1978, 10 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1105 (1978); Franko, supra
note 121.
144. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act § 404(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2153c(a) (Supp. III
1979); see id. §§ 2153d(b), 2153f(b).
145. Id. § 2153(a)(9).
146. See NUCLEAR NEWS, Oct. 1978, at 41-42; id., Apr. 1978, at 13, 143; notes
120 & 121 supra.
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be provided until we are self-sufficient in national production. 14 7
The agreement with the states participating in URENCO'4 s provides that all plutonium produced with URENCO-supplied uranium must be protected by (1) the establishment by the IAEA of
a universally applicable safeguards system for the storage of plutonium (the subject of current IPS discussions); 14 or (2) an ad
hoc storage arrangement for such plutonium under IAEA safeguards, including those established in article XII(A) of the IAEA
Statute. 150 Establishment of an acceptable international scheme
for the deposit of plutonium would thus obviate the need for any
ad hoc arrangements. Moreover, given the adamant attitude of
the Dutch Parliament, a regime established pursuant to consensus in the Expert Group on IPS might be much less objectionable
than an ad hoc arrangement negotiated with the British, Dutch,
and Germans. On the other hand, any depositary that would be
unacceptable to Brazil should be opposed in the IPS Expert
Group, since it could become binding under the terms of the
URENCO agreement.
While an international plutonium depositary might alleviate
possible friction with the United States and the URENCO countries, perhaps ultimately facilitating technology transfer and good
relations, no regime for the deposit of plutonium should be accepted if it entails substantial loss of control over the disposition
of plutonium produced in Brazil and needed for our light water
and breeder reactors. The surrender of such control to an international body, however benign the ostensible purpose, would defeat
the central goal of energy independence for our nuclear
program.'

51

Additional national interests must be weighed carefully in assessing any proposal. Considerations of military security cannot
147. See also notes 120 & 121 supra and accompanying text.
148. NUCLEAR NEWS, Oct. 1978, at 41-42.
149. Id. On current IPS negotiations, see notes 38-41 supra.
150. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, 8
U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as IAEA Statute]. Details on the Brazil-URENCO agreement of September 1, 1978, are found
in NUCLEAR NEWS, Oct. 1978, at 41-42. For a comprehensive treatment of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, see INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY, NON-PROLIFERATION AND INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS (1978).
151. See R. SCHNEIDER, supra note 45, at 50; note 76 supra and accompanying text.
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be overlooked. The de facto full-scope safeguards 52 to which we
are subject apply only to material and technology acquired from
the United States and West Germany.1 5 Brazil consequently is
under no legal restriction against the production of plutonium in
non-safeguarded facilities such as research reactors, provided no
use is made of United States or German nuclear materials and
equipment or German technology154 (the latter being susceptible
to differing interpretations). 55 Similarly, there is at present no

152. "Full-scope" safeguards are those which apply to all nuclear activities
within a country. De facto "full-scope" safeguards do not create a legal obligation to necessarily submit all future nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards. See,

e.g., W.

DONNELLY &

B.

RATHER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AND THE IN-

TERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, S. Doc. No. 402-3, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
63-120 (1976); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, NUCLEAR

PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS 151-74, 205-25 (1977).
153. See Tripartite Agreement, supra note 142; Agreement Between the International Atomic Energy Agency, Brazil, and the Federal Republic of Germany for the Application of Safeguards, Feb. 26, 1976, reprinted in G. FAHL,
INTERNATIONALES RECHT DER RtJSTUNGSBESCHRANKUNG

§ 5.3.7.2 (1976) (German

text and English translation) [hereinafter cited as Safeguards Agreement].
For the text of the 1975 cooperation agreement, see Brazilian-German Agreement, supra note 42. During the visit of Secretary of State Vance to Brazil in
November 1978, Brazil stated that it would be prepared to accept any new safeguards established by the IAEA. VEJA, Nov. 30, 1978, at 20-22.
154. See notes 81-89 supra and accompanying text.
155. Under the tripartite safeguards agreement between Brazil, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the IAEA, all nuclear material and "relevant technological information" transferred to Brazil from West Germany is covered by
IAEA safeguards which prohibit their use "for the manufacture of any nuclear
weapon or to further any other military purpose or for the manufacture of any
other nuclear explosive device." Safeguards Agreement, supra note 153, art. 2.
The Safeguards Agreement is to remain in force until all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the agreement, including subsequent generations of
produced special fissionable material, have been removed from safeguards established in the agreement (i.e., by transfer to a foreign recipient under safeguards
or by being consumed and no longer representing a proliferation risk). Id. arts.
13, 28. Moreover, even after the agreement has terminated, the design, construction, or operation of any facility or equipment for the preparation or processing
of nuclear material with the use of transferred sensitive technology (relevant
technological information) will cause the safeguards agreement to be automatically reinstated. Id. art. 28. Finally, for a period of twenty years following transfer of the technology, any nuclear facility or sensitive equipment that is
designed, constructed, or operated on the basis of "the same physical or chemical process or processes" as those transferred from Germany to Brazil, "shall be
deemed" to be the product of the transfer of safeguarded "relevant technological
information." Id. art. 3(2).
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legal restriction preventing Brazilian production and detonation
of PNEs, provided only unsafeguarded resources are employed. 5 '

These safeguards are extremely comprehensive and have led many to conclude
that the transfer of technology from Germany could not be used by Brazil to
build nuclear weapons or PNEs without flagrantly violating the safeguards
agreement. See, e.g., Courtney, supra note 10, at 246. Unfortunately the issue is
far more complicated than it first appears. While the "relevant technological
information" protected by these replication safeguards applies to sensitive activities such as enrichment and reprocessing, this term is defined as "excepting
technological information available to the public." Safeguards Agreement, supra
note 153, art. 1(d). Consequently, Brazil might plausibly argue that the construction of an unsafeguarded enrichment or reprocessing plant was based on
information in the public domain when the transfer took place, and consequently, the facility was not subject to the safeguards contained in the agreement. Brazil could even claim that a facility was based on information that had
come into the public domain subsequent to the original transfer. This is a credible argument since
The necessary knowledge for going the plutonium route on a small scale is
already in the public domain, as is much information about the Becker
nozzle process. As for the other uranium enrichment processes, probably
the best that can be expected is a slight delay in the diffusion of knowledge ....
Rathjens & Carnesale, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Proliferationin
INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR NUCLiAR FuEL REPROCESSING 3, 6 (A. Chayes
& B. Lewis eds. 1977).
Under the Safeguards Agreement, Brazil must notify the IAEA of "relevant
technological information" which has been transferred. West Germany is under
an obligation to consult with Brazil if it believes a notification to the Agency
should have been made and was not, and to report any disagreement to the
IAEA. Safeguards Agreements, supra note 153, art. 6. While one need not cynically infer that commercial incentives for such German consultations and notification to the Agency are lacking, the fact remains that the primary burden is on
Brazil.
Any disputes which arise are to be submitted to an arbitral tribunal. If only
two parties are concerned, each shall name an arbitrator and those so named
will choose a third; if all three parties are involved, each is to select an arbitrator, and the three so selected shall name a fourth arbitrator as chairman, plus a
fifth member of the panel. Decisions of the arbitral tribunal are to be made by a
majority of two or three votes, respectively. Id. art. 23. Viewing these provisions
of the agreement together, there would appear to be considerable room for Brazil to argue that its construction of an unsafeguarded enrichment plant or
reprocessing facility did not violate any of the terms of the tripartite safeguards
agreement of February 26, 1976.
156. Assuming a deliberate decision to build a bomb or PNE, IAEA safeguards on all commercial facilities would not prevent Brazil from constructing a
plutonium production reactor and small reprocessing plant to produce weapons
grade plutonium. A "dedicated" facility of this type could be constructed for as
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Brazil may also store its plutonium as it chooses unless it is a
product of United States material or equipment. 157 This situation
could change drastically if Brazil were to agree to subject all of its
plutonium to the authority of the international depositary, especially in view of the express language in article XII(A)(5) of the
'158
IAEA Statute which refers to use "for research or in reactors.
Furthermore, if Brazil were to agree to place all of its plutonium
under the authority of the international depositary, it would be
highly desirable, if not essential, that one of the plutonium depos-

itories be located in Brazil and owned and operated by Brazilians.
Only under such conditions would Brazil retain a feasible option

little as $50 million. See Betts, Paranoids,Pygmies, Pariahsand Non-Proliferation, 26 FOREIGN POLICY 157, 161 (1977). For a comprehensive discussion of the
range of possible dedicated facilities, including enrichment plants, see OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,

GUARDS

U.S. CONGRESS, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFE-

174-85 (1977). Although illegal, the clandestine construction of such fa-

cilities would be an option available even to countries which had ratified the

NPT. The response by other countries, however, probably would be much harsher in the case of a direct violation of the principal prohibition in the NPT by a
signatory, than in the case of the legal construction of such a facility by a country not under full-scope safeguards. Finally, Brazil clearly recognizes that a
dedicated facility would constitute the preferred route to nuclear weapons assuming a deliberate decision to build the bomb. This is demonstrated by the
following statement made in the course of a general defense of the nation's nuclear program:
Reason suggests the lack of justification of such suggestions (that the Brazilian-German nuclear agreement could be used for the fabrication of "nuclear devices") since, if we wanted such a program, we would have followed
another strategy that is more direct and quicker, as has been the case in
all of the countries which possess atomic weapons. (Author's translation.)
0 Estado de Sio Paulo, Oct. 11, 1978, at 8, col. 2. Indeed, the direct route option
to a weapons capability would appear to dominate the choices available to potential new entrants to the nuclear club. See, e.g., RATHJENS & CARNZsAL, supra
note 155, at 6; H. MULLER, supra note 113, at 22-25.
157. An important and highly relevant exception is established in the 1972
Brazilian-United States Cooperation Agreement which provides that the United
States shall have the right "to approve facilities which are to be used for the
storage of ...

[plutonium produced from United States-supplied materials or

equipment] which is not required for atomic energy programs in the Federative
Republic of Brazil." 1972 Cooperation Agreement, supra note 127, art. XI(B)(3).
This "safeguard right" is to be applied by the United States "[e]xcept to the
extent .

.

. [it is] suspended by virtue of the application of safeguards of the

International Atomic Energy Agency. Id. art. XI(B). It is also highly relevant to
the proper interpretation of the term "excess" in IAEA Statute, supra note 150,
art. XII(A)(5).
158. IAEA Statute, supra note 150.
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in response to certain unlikely but possible emergency contingencies. International ownership, management, and physical possession of the depository would increase the risks in exercising this
option to an unacceptable degree.
2.

Three Options

An international depositary for plutonium could take a number
of different forms. It will be useful to consider briefly three options available to Brazil.
(a)

Option I: International Control of Plutonium

Under this option, the purpose of the international depositary
would be to decide whether a state's failure to deposit or its request for release of plutonium was justified. Such decisions would
be made following pertinent investigations by the international
staff within the territory of the country concerned. The depositary would occupy a semi-autonomous relationship to the IAEA,
with membership limited to those states producing or using plutonium. Decisions concerning deposit and release would be made
according to a weighted formula which would ensure nuclear
weapons and supplier states a preponderant voice in decisions. All
plutonium in non-nuclear weapons states would be subject to the
terms of the agreement, while no restrictions would be imposed
on the military use of plutonium by the nuclear weapons states.
The criteria for deposit and release would be based on, but not
limited to, the requirements in article XII(A)(5) of the IAEA
Statute. 159 This provision could be interpreted broadly, and additional criteria for deposit or release could be established. Such
criteria might include: (1) rules governing the amount of plutonium which could be held for use in an existing reactor (government statements would not be accepted at face value, but rather
would be subjected to careful investigation and factual analysis);
(2) prohibitions against release of plutonium to any reactor not
physically under construction; and (3) requirements that plutonium be released for use only during a given time period. Additionally, provisions probably would be included permitting the
progressive strengthening and development of other non-proliferation conditions, although such amendment procedures would not
be so labeled.
159. Id.
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Option I is clearly unacceptable in terms of the overall national
interests of Brazil. Such an international regime would surrender
vital decisions affecting our energy security and independence,
and perhaps even military security, to an unpredictable international body. This option might leave Brazil at the mercy of countries which have in the past sought to block Brazil's acquisition of
an independent nuclear capability.
(b)

Option II: International Accountability for Plutonium Use

The purpose underlying this option would be to detect the diversion of plutonium from acceptable peaceful uses and, through
certain enforcement procedures, to secure compliance with the
decisions of the depositary following an official determination
that such a diversion had occurred. An individual depositary
would be owned, operated by, and located in any reprocessing
state desiring to establish one with the understanding that the
state would be required to deposit plutonium from a foreign
country either voluntarily or when such an allocation decision had
been made by the central depositary authority. Pursuant to the
Agency's Statute, the functions of the secretariat and a small staff
of inspectors would be fulfilled by the IAEA.
The criteria for deposit and release would be clearly established. All plutonium in participating states preferably would be
subject to the accounting procedures of the depositary. Nuclear
weapons states would be required to declare the amount of plutonium currently held for military purposes, and transfers to or
from the civilian sector would be prohibited. Each nuclear weapons state would be required to donate three percent of its military
plutonium to the IAEA each year, and no new plutonium could
be produced for military purposes. Civilian plutonium would be
subject to the requirements applicable to non-nuclear weapons
states. If acceptance of such an arrangement is not forthcoming,
the depositary regime could apply only to plutonium produced or
used in commercial nuclear power programs, under universally
applicable rules. Deposit of excess plutonium might be required
by the depositary authority whenever a thorough investigation
has established that there is no present or planned use for such
plutonium in commercial power programs (or in research programs as well, should the nuclear weapons states agree to accountability for all plutonium). Release of deposited plutonium
would be automatic upon a request stating it was intended for a
non-military use. If it is subsequently ascertained that the pluto-
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nium has been diverted from the approved use, the depositary
would require its redeposit.
The decisionmaking body governing deposit and release would
include all members of the depositary, and would be established
as a special committee of the IAEA General Conference. Decisions requiring deposit would be made by a two-thirds majority,
and appeals by a state would be made first to the Board of Governors, and finally to the General Conference of the Agency. A decision ordering deposit would have to be upheld by a two-thirds
majority of the Board before physical deposit actually would be
required. Should the General Conference fail to uphold the original decision, the plutonium would be returned immediately to the
appellant state.
The depositary would be established pursuant to an amendment to the IAEA Statute establishing a special committee of the
General Conference (to be known as the Committee on Uniform
Plutonium Accountability or CUPA). Membership and voting requirements of CUPA, procedures for appeal, related matters, and
the obligations of member states would be set forth in a special
Protocol to the IAEA Statute, and would be included by reference
in the amendment to the Statute itself. The Protocol would have
the status of a treaty and would come into effect only after it had
been ratified by four-fifths of all states engaged or planning to
engage in the commercial production or use of plutonium.
(c)

Option III: Non-Participation in Any International
Depositary for Plutonium

Should the Expert Group on IPS reach a consensus on the establishment of a depositary, and should such a depositary come
into being with broad participation, Brazil would always have the
option of not participating. However, such a decision might entail
certain costs. First, the details of the ad hoc storage arrangement
with URENCO would have to be worked out and thus could affect the supply of fuel to Angra II and 111.160 Second, Brazilian
non-participation could lead to an increase in non-proliferation
pressures. Should a seventh state explode a PNE, these pressures
might even bring our agreements with West Germany into question.1 61 This is not likely, however. Third, Argentine anxieties
160. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
161. The Israeli raid on the Iraqi Osirak reactor on June 7, 1981 suggests
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might well be increased by such a decision, and a local nuclear
arms race could ensue. Finally, if Brazil's refusal to participate
persuades other states to follow suit, the depositary may not
work, and the existing non-proliferation regime may begin to unravel. These disadvantageous results are not likely. Brazil and
other countries could probably block consensus on an unacceptable regime. The matter could be referred for study to the IAEA
General Conference or to a United Nations Conference on
Problems of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. By the time
those bodies reached any decision, the whole idea could well be
moot.6

2

However, should obstruction or refusal to participate be

chosen as the course of action, Brazil would pay the costs involved in the unraveling of the non-proliferation regime.
3. Recommendation
Option II is the preferred alternative for Brazil. Details are provided in the draft Brazilian proposal, infra, which could be
presented to the Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage. Certain provisions in our proposal (e.g., CUPA authority over
all plutonium in all countries), which are designed to shift the
ground of debate in our favor, can be used as bargaining chips
and dismissed if an acceptable scheme is offered. Our proposal
makes no mention of the IAEA study on "The International
Management of Plutonium."' 6 3 The omission is deliberate, for we
do not wish to call attention to proposals for international control
of plutonium, but rather would prefer to shift the debate to
schemes for international accountability for plutonium use.
Several other issues not fully discussed in the proposal for tactical reasons deserve mention here. First, article XII(A)(5) refers
only to plutonium use "for research or in reactors,"' which
raises the question of how Brazil can protect its capacity to manufacture and detonate PNEs.1' 5 It would not be advisable to drive

other events may fuel non-proliferation concerns and pressures as well. For details of the raid, see N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
162. Following a Yugoslav initiative, the United Nations Conference on the

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy has been convened for 1983. J.
note 14, at 140.
163. See, e.g., M.

JAMES, THE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT

YAGER,

supra

OF PLUTONIUM

(1977).
164. IAEA Statute, supra note 150.
165. Brazil might argue, for example, that because no mention of PNEs is

Fall 1981]

NUCLEAR POWER IN BRAZIL

for a broad interpretation of this term in order to include
PNEs. 16" Rather, plutonium for research was excluded from the
authority of CUPA and the depositary on the assumption that
the best way to secure plutonium for PNEs would be through the
construction of a reactor specially designed for plutonium production and not subject to IAEA safeguards. The inclusion not only
of plutonium produced in commercial nuclear facilities but also of
that produced in "other IAEA-safeguarded facilities" was
adopted in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime in
other countries. 167 Our commercial
reprocessing plant will remain
68
under safeguards in any event.1

Second, while our strict interpretation of the term "excess" in
article XII(A)(5) is set forth in the text of the draft Brazilian proposal, 1"6 we did not draw attention to the issues raised by it. The
purpose of such interpretations, of course, is to ensure that Brazil
retains control over all plutonium that it will eventually need for
its power programs.
Third, there is a danger in the release language of article
XII(A)(5) which refers to a "request . . . of the members con-

cerned." This could be interpreted to mean a request not by the
state itself, but rather by an international authority. We stress
the need to avoid such an interpretation; however, there is no reason to point out this possibility to others.
Finally, we have suggested that article XII(A)(5) be accepted,
despite its limitations regarding PNEs, because it categorically
states that release must be automatic upon request. Moreover, all
of our commercial activities fall within the accepted end-uses
under article XII(A)(5); 170 thus, the difficult burden of demonstrating any new conditions not already contained in the article
will be on the complaining parties, who must convince two-thirds
of the members of the IAEA to approve their proposals in order
7
for article XII(A)(5) to be amended.1 '

made in art. XII(A)(5), that provision does not prohibit the release of plutonium
for such "peaceful" purposes.
166. To take this position publicly would arouse suspicion of Brazil's intentions and contribute to an increase in non-proliferation pressures.
167. See note 21 supra.
168. See notes 152 and 153 supra and accompanying texts.
169. See text accompanying notes 172-92 infra.
170. IAEA Statute, supra note 150.
171. Id. art. XVIII(C).
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4. Hypothetical Draft Brazilian Proposal for the Establishment
of an International Plutonium Depositary
(a) Introduction
The Government of the Republic of Brazil is pleased to introduce the present proposal for the establishment of a plutonium
depositary under IAEA auspices. Brazil has been a firm proponent of non-proliferation measures for many years 7 2 and favors
continued efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons. This
proposal is intended to form the basis for agreement on international arrangements based on the principles of non-discrimination, mutual respect, and the sovereign equality of states. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) represented
an admirable effort to reach a consensus on questions related to
energy independence and non-proliferation which can be solved,
if they can be solved at all, only on the basis of international consensus and agreement. For this reason, we feel obliged to call the
attention of participants in the Expert Group on International
Plutonium Storage (IPS) to our original understanding, shared by
all parties, that during the two-year duration of the INFCE
study, no new measures were to be adopted by any state which
would endanger existing programs or agreements on the peaceful
use of nuclear energy. 17 3 Regrettably, by seeking unilaterally to

impose political restrictions on the export or subsequent transfer
of nuclear materials, equipment and technology,17 4 certain states

adopted legislation which violated this understanding. Such ac:IV of the NPT as parties to that
tions flagrantly violate article
75
treaty have pointed out.

The spread of nuclear weapons cannot be controlled by pro172. Brazil was in fact an early leader in the movement for the establishment
of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. Its leadership waned considerably, however, following the 1964 coup which brought the military to power. See J.
REDICK, supra note 71, at 28; 0 programa nuclearbrasileiro,un dossig hist6rico,
12

RESENHA DE POLITICA EXTERIOR DO BRASIL 14-16

(1977).

173. See, e.g., Hildebrand, supra note 117, at 53; Franko, supra note 121, at
1198-99.
174. See, e.g., notes 140-50 supra and accompanying text.
175. Betts, Paranoids,Pygmies, Pariahsand Non-Proliferation,supra note
156, at 157, 171. An embargo of sensitive fuel facilities could be interpreted as a

violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by affected parties and possibly used
as an excuse, for violating the treaties themselves. Id. On the background and
reach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty art. 4, see 1 M. SHAKER, supra note 113,
at 293-337 (1980).
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ceeding on such a basis. Unilateral restrictions can only introduce
uncertainty and chaos into world markets for nuclear energy supplies and technology, and may ultimately contribute to a dangerous international environment which promotes the manufacture
and use of nuclear weapons. Brazil believes that in order to avoid
such unilateral actions in the future, any agreement establishing a
plutonium depositary should entail mutual obligations and include sanctions against any supplier state which unilaterally establishes political requirements for the export of nuclear materi1 76

als and technology.

Mutuality of obligation dictates that we view horizontal
proliferation in tandem with vertical proliferation and the need
for nuclear disarmament in general. 17 7 Accordingly, we propose

that the depositary arrangements cover all plutonium produced
or held anywhere in the world, whether for military or for civilian
use. We further propose that all nuclear weapons states be required to declare the amount of plutonium in their military arsenals and that each be required to donate and deposit three percent of its original declared stock of military plutonium to the
IAEA each year. 7 8 Transfer between the military and the civilian
sectors must be totally prohibited. 17 9 In all other respects, the
rules of the international depositary for plutonium are to apply to
all participating states. Finally, participants in the Expert Group
on IPS should bear in mind that our objective is to minimize
proliferation without jeopardizing energy supplies or affecting the
full and free development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

176. See Courtney, supra note 10, at 254-55; note 116 supra.
177. See note 113 supra.
178. This is not a novel idea. On April 20, 1964, the United States announced reductions of 20% in its production of plutonium and 40% in its production of enriched uranium (i.e., for nuclear weapons), while the Soviet Union
announced that it would stop construction of two plutonium production reactors. 1 M. SHAKER, supra note 113, at 639. On the cutoff of production of fissile
materials for weapons purposes, see id. at 639-43. In 1978, the United States
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reportedly developed a plan calling for
a ban on the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons; the Defense
Department, however, blocked further consideration of the plan. Id. at 641, see
note 246 infra.
179. The chief problem with such a proposal, of course, is the potential difficulty of verification.
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Purpose of the Depositary

The purpose of an international depositary for plutonium shall
be to decrease the risk that plutonium will ever be used again, by
any country, for military purposes. 180 To achieve this end we suggest that the Statute of the IAEA be amended to establish a special Committee on Uniform Plutonium Accountability (CUPA),
whose powers would include supervision and initial enforcement
of the mutual duties and obligations undertaken under the depositary arrangements by nuclear weapons states, supplier states,
and other states engaged in or planning to engage in the production or use of plutonium. CUPA would be charged with the maintenance of effective accountability for all plutonium subject to its
authority and would be responsible for applying investigatory and
dispute resolution procedures whenever it appears that plutonium
subject to its authority has been diverted from peaceful to military uses.
(c)

Organizational Structure

The international plutonium depositary would form an integral
part of the IAEA and, except, where otherwise expressly established, would be subject to the terms and provisions of the Statute of the Agency. CUPA, created as a special committee of the
General Conference, would have primary responsibility for the
oversight of all international arrangements establishing a plutonium depositary. The international regime for plutonium accountability under the direction of CUPA would be known as
"the international depositary for plutonium," and the individual
stores of plutonium in participating countries would be known as
"plutonium depositories."
CUPA will be comprised of one representative from every
IAEA member state which produces or uses plutonium. Any
CUPA member which has acquired or is in the process of acquiring a reprocessing facility may establish a CUPA-affiliated depository under its own ownership and management. Plutonium will
be stored in the depository in the following circumstances: (1)
under the terms of a contract with another state; (2) pursuant to
an allocation decision by CUPA ordering the depository to accept
for deposit plutonium from another state; or (3) pursuant to a
180. Brazil would not necessarily oppose the use of plutonium in nuclear
submarines, however.
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decision by CUPA that plutonium belonging to the state owning
the depository is "excess" (i.e., not destined for research, reactors,
or other peaceful uses)"' 1 and must, therefore, be deposited in a
facility under the authority of CUPA. Each state may maintain
the plutonium it owns but is not required to deposit at the same
or at an adjacent site, as long as all deposited plutonium is maintained separately for safeguards accounting purposes. International depositories and national stores of plutonium ideally would
be located next to reprocessing facilities, in physically secure nuclear parks, in order to eliminate the risks inherent in plutonium
transportation.
The small cadre of additional inspectors and secretariat personnel needed to perform CUPA-related functions will form a part of
the regular IAEA Secretariat. They will be subject to the authority of the Director General, who will be charged with cooperating
fully with CUPA, in accordance with article VII(B) of the IAEA
18 2
Statute as amended.
The above arrangements are advantageous for several reasons.
First, establishment of the depositary (including CUPA) within
the existing structure of IAEA avoids the unnecessary duplication
of effort and proliferation of bureaucracy which would result if
the depositary were to be established as independent from the
Agency. Second, the Agency is superbly equipped to apply the

safeguards established in article XII(A)(5),183 which will constitute the basic criteria for deposit and release to be applied by
CUPA. Third, the creation of a separate organization would
184
weaken and perhaps lead to the balkanization of the Agency.
Finally, we believe that the Agency represents a forum in which
the developing countries can effectively voice their concerns.
(d)

Criteria for Deposit and Release

The plutonium that is to be subject to the authority and decisions of CUPA must be defined before the criteria for deposit and

181. Brazil might view "other peaceful purposes" to include PNEs. See notes
164-69 supra and accompanying text.
182. See text accompanying note 191 infra.
183. IAEA Statute, supra note 150.
184. Another Brazilian consideration is that a new organization might be
dominated by weapons and nuclear supplier states and thus have a membership
or voting formula which would be less sympathetic to Brazil than the IAEA
General Conference and Board of Governors.
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release are established. We shall propose two acceptable options.
Under the first and preferred option, all plutonium in the world
would be subject to the authority of CUPA. Each nuclear weapons state would be required to declare the amount of plutonium
currently held for military purposes, and would be obligated to
donate and deposit three percent of its original military stock of
plutonium to the IAEA annually.18 5 Such a measure would constitute a minimal step toward compliance with the provisions of article VI of the NPT by parties to the treaty.188 The production of
new plutonium for military purposes in nuclear weapons states
would be prohibited, and transfers of plutonium from the civilian
to the military sector would be proscribed. Finally, all non-military plutonium would be subject to the authority of CUPA in accordance with universally applicable norms and procedures. This
option represents a balanced approach to the international risks
caused by the use of plutonium; we can imagine no legitimate reason for any nuclear weapons state to refuse to participate in such
a scheme.
Under our second option, all plutonium produced or used in
commercial power programs or in other IAEA-safeguarded facilities would be subject to the authority of CUPA. Since the major
risks of proliferation are related to potential diversions of plutonium from commercial programs, the second option would serve
principal non-proliferation objectives. The criteria for deposit and
release to be applied by CUPA would be those currently established in article XII(A)(5) of the Statute of the Agency. These
criteria, which are particularly appropriate since the depositary
forms an integral part of the Agency, could be changed only by
amending the Statute by a two-thirds vote in the General Conference and ratification by two-thirds of all IAEA members.18 7 The
provisions in article XII(A)(5) must be strictly interpreted in accordance with the terms of article III(C) of the Statute, which
provides: "In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall not
make assistance to members subject to any political, economic,
military, or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of
this Statute."18 8
Article XII(A)(5) specifically requires that plutonium not desig-

185. A figure as high as 5% would be possible.
186. See note 113 supra.
187. IAEA Statute, supra note 150, art. 18(c).
188. Id.
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nated for research purposes must be used in reactors which already exist or are in some stage of planning or construction.""9 It
further requires deposit with the Agency (i.e., in a CUPA-affiliated depository) of any "excess" special fissionable material (i.e.,
plutonium) which is not destined for research or for use in specified reactors under continuing Agency safeguards. Such deposit is
required to prevent stockpiling (not mere storage for future use)
in order to avoid the risks of diversion to illicit end-uses. The
criteria for release of deposited plutonium are clearly stated in
article XII(A)(5). At the request of the member concerned, deposited plutonium is to be returned promptly for use in research or
specified reactors under continuing IAEA safeguards. The criteria
stated in article XII(A)(5) are sufficient to detect, in a timely
manner, any illicit use of plutonium; should a diversion occur, the
enforcement procedures can be activated to secure compliance
with the decisions of the CUPA. There is no need to amend article XII(A)(5) in order to introduce political factors into deposit
and release decisions. Any attempt to do so would only introduce
further insecurities into the world plutonium market.
(e)

Decision Process on Questions of Deposit and Release

Decisions on questions of deposit and release would be made by
CUPA. As noted above, the decision on a request for release of
deposited plutonium would be automatic, in accordance with the
express terms of article XII(A)(5). The decision to require deposit
of excess plutonium would constitute the basic enforcement
mechanism of the depositary. Such a decision could be made by a
two-thirds vote of members present, whenever the results of an
investigation by the CUPA staff revealed that plutonium had
been diverted by a member from the accepted end-uses stipulated
in article XII(A)(5), and the respective state had failed to satisfy
CUPA either that the results of the investigation were erroneous
or that the plutonium in question had been returned to a proper
channel for an accepted end-use.
Should CUPA's decision be adverse to a state member, the latter would have the right to appeal the holding to the Board of
Governors of the Agency. If the Board upholds the CUPA decision by a two-thirds vote, the state member would then be required to make a physical deposit of the plutonium in question to

189. Id.
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a CUPA-affiliated depository. The affected member would have
the further right to appeal the decision to the General Conference, and should the latter fail to uphold the decision of the
Board of Governors by a two-thirds vote, the deposited plutonium would be returned to the appellant state.
This procedure would be also be applied whenever investigation
reveals that released plutonium has been diverted from an accepted end-use. In such a case, CUPA may require redeposit of
the plutonium in question. In order to verify the use of plutonium
under its authority, CUPA may send inspectors to the various depositories as often as it so decides; a permanent inspector might
even be assigned to each depository. Since inspections currently
may be carried out only once or twice a year, the increased frequency of inspection would significantly enhance the capability of
IAEA to detect diversion of plutonium. The assignment of inspectors and the initiation of investigations, however, would have to
be carried out on a non-discriminatory basis; thus, depositories in
nuclear weapons states, supplier countries, and other states would
receive equal scrutiny from CUPA inspectors.
Investigations and the deliberations of CUPA, the Board, and
the General Conference would be confidential in order to avoid
unfair publicity and to protect member states which may be
guilty of no more than an honest or bureaucratic mistake. The
objective of the verification and enforcement procedures is not to
generate adverse publicity, but rather to secure voluntary compliance by all states with the decisions of CUPA. Public pressures
are to be employed only when a state refuses to comply with
Agency decisions following exhaustion of the appeals process. At
that point, the sanctions contemplated in article XIX of the Statute may be applied.190
(f) Decision Process on Questions Related to the Obligations
of Nuclear Weapons States and Supplier States
Should CUPA become aware of discrepancies in safeguards accounting records or of other evidence indicating a nuclear weap190. Id. art. XIX(B), which provides as follows:
A member which has persistently violated the provisions of this Statute or
of any agreement entered into by it pursuant to this Statute may be suspended from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership by
the General Conference acting by a two-thirds majority of the members
present and voting upon recommendation by the Board of Governors.
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ons state has transferred military plutonium to or from the civilian sector, it may require deposit of the plutonium in question in
accordance with procedures similar to those described above. If a
nuclear weapons state should fail to donate and deposit three percent of its military plutonium to the IAEA each year, CUPA may
seek compliance (as infra). In the event that a supplier nation
unilaterally imposes political restrictions on the export or retransfer of nuclear materials (and perhaps technology), any member of
CUPA may bring a complaint before the Committee. If, following
an investigation, a violation is found by a majority vote of CUPA,
then a Special Conference of all CUPA member states would be
convened immediately in order to adopt by majority vote one or
more of the following measures: (1) suspension of the offending
member from CUPA; (2) recommendation to the General Conference that the state concerned be suspended from membership in
the IAEA, in accordance with article XIX(B) of the Statute; or
(3) suspension of the operation of CUPA and the international
depositary regime, pending compliance by the state concerned
with the decisions of CUPA.
The Government of Brazil believes that this set of provisions
will preclude discriminatory aspects of depositary arrangements.
These provisions stress that we are embarking upon a joint enterprise, the goal of which is to reduce the risks to humanity which
result from military use of plutonium.
(g)

Legal Authority for the Depositary

The regime described above can be implemented with only minor amendments to the IAEA Statute."" The details of provisions
191.

The following provisions could be added to the Statute, pursuant to the

procedures for amendment established in article XVIII:
Article V
G.

The General Conference shall appoint from among its members a

Committee on Uniform Plutonium Accountability (CUPA), which shall be
comprised of one member from each state engaged or planning to engage
in the production or use of plutonium.
H. The Committee on Uniform Plutonium Accountability shall have the

duties and responsibilities assigned to it in the Protocol for the Establishment of Uniform Plutonium Accountability, once that instrument has entered into force.

Article VI
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governing duties and obligations, decision processes, and voting
procedures of the regime would be contained in a separate Protocol for the establishment of uniform plutonium accountability.
The Protocol would enter into force when four-fifths of the eligible states had deposited their respective instruments of ratification. It would continue in force indefinitely unless suspended as a
result of violation by a nuclear weapons or supplier state. Finally,
any party could withdraw from the regime after giving one year's
notice.
(h)

Conclusion

The Government of the Republic of Brazil presents the above
proposal for consideration by the Expert Group on International
Plutonium Storage. We believe that because it involves mutual
obligations on the part of all states concerned, it offers a viable
basis for significant progress in the attempt to limit the military
use of plutonium. Unlike some proposals, it is fully in agreement
with the principle of the sovereign equality of all members of the
IAEA, a fundamental principle of the Agency set out in article
IV(C) of the Statute. The proposal provides a solid foundation for
international consensus and agreement, and accordingly we urge
that it be adopted.

F. (bis). The Board of Governors shall also exercise those powers and

duties assigned to it in the Protocol for the Establishment of Uniform Plutonium Accountability.
Article VII
B. (his). The Director General shall also be responsible for cooperation
with and carrying out the functions assigned to him by the Committee on
Uniform Plutonium Accountability referred to in Article V(G) supra.
IAEA Statute, supra note 150, art. XVIII. An Amendment may be proposed by
any state, id. art. XVIII(A), and shall enter into force for all members when (1)
approved by the General Conference by a.vote of two-thirds of those present
and voting, and (2) accepted by two-thirds of all members in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes, to be effected by deposit of an instrument of acceptance. Id. art. XVIH(C). If a member is unwilling to accept an
amendment as approved, it may withdraw from the Agency. Id. art. XVIH(D).
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Full Entry into Force for Brazil of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco

Signed in 1967, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 192 prohibits the production, testing, or use of "any nuclear weapons," as well as their
storage or deployment in a delimited zone surrounding and including Latin America.19 Brazil ratified the Treaty on January
29, 1968, but the Treaty has not come into force in Brazil due to
the absence of all of the ratifications required under the terms of
article 28(1)."' During the negotiations, Brazil successfully insisted upon adoption of the mechanism contained in article
28(2),'"9 which permits waiver of the unanimous ratification requirement, in which case the Treaty enters into force for the state
waiving this requirement. 198 While Brazil has stated that it is
bound under international law not to frustrate the objectives of
192. See note 18 supra. Brazil initiated the measures in the United Nations
which ultimately led to the adoption of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. See Courtney,
supra note 10, at 255. On the Treaty of Tlatelolco in general, see 2 M. SHAKER,
supra note 113, at 906-17 (1980); Espiell, The Treaty for the Prohibitionof Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (The Tlatelolco Treaty); Present Situation
and Future Prospects, 20 IAEA BULL. 25 (1978); Robinson, The Treaty of
Tlatelolco and the United States: A Latin American Nuclear Free Zone, 64
AM. J. INT'L L. 282 (1970); Redick, Regional Nuclear Arms Control in Latin
America, 29 INT'L ORGANIZATION 415 (1975); Redick, Regional Restraint, supra
note 111; Redick, The Tlatelolco Regime and Non-Proliferation in Latin
America, supra note 54.
193. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 18, arts. 1, 4. Pending ratification of
the Treaty, its two protocols, and the agreements for safeguards by all required
parties, the Treaty will apply only to the territories for which it is in force. Id.
art. 4(1). Once these requirements are met, the Treaty will extend to a broad
geographical area defined in article 4(2).
194. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 18, art. 28(1), provides that, absent a
waiver under article 28(2), see note 241 infra, the treaty will come into force
upon (1) ratification by all of the Latin American states in existence in 1967, (2)
ratification of Additional Protocol I by all states having international responsibility for territories within the zone of application of the treaty, (3) ratification
of Additional Protocol II by all powers possessing nuclear weapons, and (4) conclusion of the corresponding safeguards agreements in accordance with article 13
of the Treaty. Id. All of these requirements must be satisfied before the Treaty
enters into effect for a ratifying Party, unless the latter waives these requirements under the terms of article 28(2) of the Treaty. See notes 240 & 241 infra
and accompanying text.
195. See note 194 supra; notes 240 & 241 infra and accompanying text.
196. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 18, art. 28(2); see notes 240 & 241
infra.
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the Treaty,19 7 it has made no waiver under article 28(2).

Recent developments suggest that full entry into force of the
Treaty is now a real possibility. On May 26, 1977, the United
States signed Protocol 1,l98 which involves a commitment to ob-

serve the terms of the Treaty on the part of non-Latin American
countries which have possessions in the zone covered by the
Treaty.19 9 France announced in May 1978 that it too would adhere to Protocol I, and has since ratified it.200 At the same time,
on December 12, 1978, the Soviet Union ratified Protocol 11201 (in
which nuclear.weapons states agree to respect the aims and provisions of the Treaty, and pledge not to use or threaten to use nu197. See 0 programa nuclear brasileiro,12 RESENHA DE POLITICA EXTERIOR
Do BRASIL 1, 15 (1977); cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18,
opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/11/Add. 2, reprinted
in 63 AM. J. INT'L. L. 875, 880 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]
(state is obligated not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its
entry into force).
In October 1978 a government statement in response to criticisms in the German and Brazilian press reaffirmed its position:
The position of the Brazilian government on the subject of nuclear arms
has already been manifested many times by [the Foreign Ministry] and by
the President of the Republic himself. Brazil is a firm defender, on the
international level, of the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and interprets this principle in the most comprehensive manner
possible.
0 Estado de Sio Paulo, Oct. 11, 1978, at 8, col. 2 (author's translation). Nonetheless, one should note that this statement does not exclude the possibility of
future development of peaceful nuclear devices.
198. U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS 57 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DISARMAMENT
AGENCY]. For the hearing and report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, see Treaty of Tlatelolco: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). Ratification by the United States has
been prevented by a dispute between the Foreign Relations Committee and the
Executive over a question of executive privilege. See Redick, The Tlatelolco Regime and Non-Proliferationin Latin America, 35 INT'L ORGANIZATION 103, 107109 (1981).
199. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 18, Additional Protocol I, art. 1, reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 198, at 74. See Treaty of
Tlatelolco: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); note 198 supra.
200. B. WESTON, R. FALK & A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER 439 n. (1980).
201. Petrov, The Soviet Union and the Denuclearized Zone in Latin
America, 55 INT'L AFF. 95, 98-99 (1979).
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clear weapons against the contracting states), 20 2 thus removing a
major obstacle to full entry into force of the Treaty. Of particular
interest to Brazil are indications from Argentina that it will sign
the Treaty.20 3
These developments suggest that Brazil should carefully consider whether it should (1) exercise a waiver under article 28(2),
or (2) actively promote full entry into force of the Treaty for all
remaining parties. Before considering which of these steps might
best be taken if this general option is chosen, let us consider the

benefits and costs for Brazil which full entry into force could
entail.
1.

Benefits

The major benefit of the Treaty to Brazil would be a reduction-of non-proliferation pressures which represent a potential threat
to Brazil's long-term development of nuclear capabilities. A number of specific benefits also should be taken into accoun./First,

full-scope safeguards are not clearly required under the T telolco
Treaty. Article 13 provides only that each contracting party shall

negotiate agreements with the IAEA for the application of safeguards to "its nuclear activities." While it might be argued that
this includes all nuclear activities, the preparatory work reveals
that a proposal for full-scope safeguards was rejected due to the

202. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 18, Additional Protocol H, done Feb.
14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 754, T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 364, [hereinafter cited
as Additional Protocol II]. Article 1 of Additional Protocol H provides that the
Treaty of Tlatelolco itself "shall be fully respected by the Parties to this Protocol in all its express aims and provisions." Parties to the Protocol undertake
"not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of
the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty (i.e., testing, use, manufacture, production, acquisition, receipt, storage, or installation of any "nuclear weapons"). Id.
art. 2. Parties to Additional Protocol H expressly "undertake not to use or to
threaten to use nuclear weapons" against the parties to the Treaty. Id. art. 3.
203. See Espiell, supra note 192, at 26. Thus, the only steps required to satisfy the ratification requirements of article 28(1) are deposit of the respective
instruments of ratification by the United States (Protocol I); by Argentina and
Cuba (The Treaty); and possibly by Guyana (the Treaty). All except Cuba and
Guyana have declared they would ratify the respective instruments. Given the
Soviet interest in non-proliferation, Cuban ratification should be forthcoming,
and the dispute between Venezuela and Guyana should be amenable to rapid
solution, at least for purposes of Tlatelolco. The Treaty would then enter into
force for all parties concerned. See Redick, supra note 54, at 106-109.
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opposition of Brazil and Argentina. 0 4 Moreover, article 13 must
be interpreted in light of article 12, which provides that the "control system" (including that portion established by article 13)
"shall be used in particular for the purpose of verifying" that devices, services, and facilities "are not used in the testing or manufacture of nuclear weapons. ' Hence, the safeguards requirement of article 13 is less comprehensive than that contained in
article III(1) of the NPT. Given our 1972 tripartite safeguards
agreement with the United States and the IAEA, 208 and our 1976
agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany and the
IAEA, 20 7 Brazil could forcefully argue that: (1) these agreements,
in conjunction with the special inspections system established by
the Treaty, satisfy the requirements of article 13; (2) in view of
the foregoing, any new agreement pursuant to article 13 must not
require significant additional undertakings on the part of Brazil;
and (3) any additional safeguards requirements, beyond those
strictly required by article 12 and 13, must be fully applicable to
all parties to the Treaty and each of its two Protocols. Finally,
early waiver under article 28(2)208 should be used as a bargaining
tool with the IAEA in negotiating any new safeguards agreement
which may be required to satisfy article 13.
Second, peaceful nuclear explosions are permitted under the
terms of the Treaty.20 9 Article 1 prohibits the detonation only of
"nuclear weapons" as further defined in article 5 ("any device
which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled
manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes"). Article 5 cannot be interpreted to include peaceful nuclear devices, however, in view of the
language of article 18(1), which expressly provides: "The Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for
peaceful purposes-including explosions which involve devices
similar to those used in nuclear weapons . ..

204.
205.
206.
207.

.,

While the

See Redick, supra note 192, at 427-28 (1975).
Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 18, art. 12(2).
Tripartite Agreement, supra note 142.
Safeguards Agreement, supra note 153.

208. See notes 240-41 infra and accompanying text.
209. Upon signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Brazil stated its understanding
that "article 18 authorizes ... explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes . . . including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in
nuclear weapons." Rosenbaum & Cooper, supra note 116, at 77 n.7.
210. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 18.
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United States has made statements interpreting articles 5 and 18
as prohibiting PNEs,211 such an interpretation is untenable and
without legal force.212
A third benefit under the Treaty is that it would strengthen the
legal position of Brazil as it proceeds with enrichment and
reprocessing in the face of non-proliferation pressures from
abroad. Article 17 expressly provides that nothing in the Treaty
"shall prejudice the rights of the Contracting Parties, in conformity with the Treaty, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,
in particularfor their economic development and social progress
....
23 In view of Protocol I's undertaking to fully respect the
Treaty "in all its express aims and provisions, '1 4 the United
States could be accused of violating, by its efforts to prevent Brazilian acquisition of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, its in21 5
ternational obligations not only under article IV of the NPT
but also under Protocol II and the Treaty of Tlatelolco 2 6 as well.
Brazil's rights to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are
implicitly protected under article 17 on a basis of equality and

211. See Additional Protocol H, supra note 202, Understandings and Declarations Attached to Senate Advice and Consent, reproduced in DISARMAMENT
AGENCY, supra note 198, at 61-62.
212. Given the express terms of articles 5 and 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,
this is untenable on logical grounds. It is without legal force because the Treaty
itself is not subject to reservation. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 18, art. 27;
cf. Betts, Courtney, supra note 66, at 388 ("Although the United States is on
uncertain legal ground in interpreting the Tlatelolco treaty as precluding peaceful nuclear explosions, it should make efforts to encourage other parties to the
treaty to accept this interpretation"). The question of the legality of PNEs must
ultimately be answered not by majority vote of the parties in 1981, but by the
rules of customary international law which are incorporated, at least in part, in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Supra note 197, arts. 31-33; see
I. BRowNLiE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 623-30 (3d ed. 1979);
NGUYEN Quoc DINH, P. DALLIER, & A. PELLET, DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 24550 (2d ed. 1980).
213. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 18, art. 17.
214. See Additional Protocol II, supra note 202, art. 1.
215. The United States has no obligation to Brazil under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, for the latter is not a signatory. The violation, if any, would have to
be of the United States obligation under the treaty vis-a-vis the Federal Republic of Germany, presumably by interfering with German development of peaceful
uses of nuclear energy under the terms of its 1975 Agreement with Brazil.
216. See Additional Protocol II, supra note 202, art. 1. Even if the United
States were to ratify Additional Protocol I, it is doubtful that the argument in
the text would be taken seriously.
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non-discrimination (in contrast with the NPT), and foreign attempts to foreclose the exercise of those rights may themselves
constitute violations of treaty provisions under international law.
The forcefulness of such arguments, which have broad appeal to
developing countries, should significantly increase the leverage of
Brazil against the United States, whether in international forums
or in bilateral negotiations related to our nuclear cooperation
agreement of 1972 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978.217 Since it is not a party to the NPT, Brazil cannot argue
strongly that the United States is violating article IV of that instrument; with Tlatelolco fully in force, however, Brazil will have
strong legal arguments in defense of its national sovereignty.
Fourth, under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Brazil will have a
strong voice in all decisions made within the Agency (OPANAL)
established by the Treaty. Voting in the General Conference will
be on an equal basis (one nation, one vote) and will be limited to
the Latin American states.21 Brazil surely will occupy a seat on
the five-member Executive Council. Due to its influence in Latin
America, it should be in a strong position to avoid adverse decisions in connection with any special inspection which may be
initiated in order to verify a suspected violation of the Treaty.
Moreover, the rules cannot be changed without Brazil's consent,
for unanimous ratification or optional waiver is required for the
adoption of any amendment. 2 9 Finally, any disputes over the
terms of the Treaty which are not settled shall be referred to the
International Court of Justice, with the prior consent of the
parties.220
Fifth, Brazil would have a right to request that a special inspection be ordered by the Council to verify any suspected violation
of the Treaty by any Latin American country which may be involved in the production of nuclear weapons.221
Sixth, under Protocol II Brazil may be protected to a significant degree from the deployment of nuclear-weapons submarines
by the Soviet Union or any other hostile nuclear weapons state.222
217.

See notes 140-45 supra and accompanying text.

218. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 18, art. 9(5).
219. Id. arts. 28, 29(2).

220. Id. art. 24.
221. Id. art. 16.
222. See Additional Protocol II, supra note 202, arts. 1-3; Treaty of
Tlatelolco, supra note 18, Preamble, arts. 1, 3-4.
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Seventh, full implementation of the nuclear-free zone would
eliminate the potential threat of Cuba serving as launching area
for nuclear weapons. Soviet adherence to Protocol II and Cuban
ratification of the Treaty (the latter still in doubt) could significantly increase long-term security in the Western Hemisphere.
Eighth, entry into force of the Treaty for Brazil would help deter an unraveling of the existing non-proliferation regime. While
most of our neighbors have ratified both the Treaty of Tlatelolco
and the NPT,223 without certain minimal reinforcement there is a
danger that states may withdraw from the non-proliferation regime established under these treaties.
Ninth, should Brazil decide in the future to explode a PNE, it
would have an airtight justification under international law for so
doing. While a strong international reaction could be anticipated,
the strength of Brazil's legal case would help to dilute its intensity and provide a legal defense against arguments used to justify
reprisal action.
Finally, Brazil may withdraw from the Treaty if, in its opinion
"there have arisen or may arise circumstances ...

which affect

its supreme interests or the peace and security of one or more
Contracting Parties.

' 224

Similarly, the rise of a new nuclear weap-

ons state would suspend operation of the Treaty until that nation
ratifies Protocol II, provided Brazil has not waived the requirements of article 28(1)(c) of the Treaty225 (requiring ratification of
Protocol II by all nuclear weapons states).
223.

Columbia has ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and accepted its opera-

tive force, but has not ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty; Chile has ratified
the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but has not exercised the waiver which would bring it
into force for that country; Argentina has not ratified the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and has signed but not yet ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Redick,
supra note 54, at 306-07.
224. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 18, art. 30(1). This provision provides
for withdrawal "if, in the opinion of the denouncing State, there have arisen or
may arise circumstances connected with the content of this Treaty or of the

annexed Additional Protocols I and II which affect its supreme interests or the
peace and security of one or more Contracting Parties." Id. Denunciation of the
Treaty under the previous clause will take effect three months after delivery of
the respective notification to the General Secretary of the Agency. Id. art. 30(2).
Presumably, this delay will allow time for diplomatic pressures to be brought to
bear.

225. See notes 194-96 supra and accompanying text; notes 240-41 infra and
accompanying text.
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Disadvantages

The Treaty of Tlatelolco is not without disadvantages from
Brazil's point of view. The very ambiguity of the safeguards requirement contained in article 13226 could create a focal point for
renewed pressures on Brazil to adopt full-scope safeguards over
all of its nuclear activities.2 2 Nonetheless, Brazil could decide
that full-scope safeguards are acceptable in order to obtain guarantees from Argentina and other neighboring states or concessions from the United States. Even under the assumption that
the risks of industrial espionage, the discriminatory nature of
such safeguards 22 (requiring IAEA access to our research labora-

tories but not to those of the United States), 229 and national security considerations suggest the desirability of rejecting fullscope safeguards, international pressures could be countered by
reiterating the readiness of Brazil to adopt any safeguards
ac23 0
Protocols.
its
and
Treaty
the
to
parties
cepted by all
Second, article 18 of the Treaty permits thorough observation
by Agency and IAEA personnel of activities related to the detonation of any peaceful nuclear device.2 1 Undder exceptional circum226. See notes 204-08 supra and accompanying text.
227. See note 166 supra.
228. See Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 18, art. 13. The terms of article 13
call for "the application of safeguards to its nuclear activities," which arguably
include all of its nuclear activities (i.e., full-scope safeguards). But see notes
204-08 supra and accompanying text. On the other hand, the United StatesI.A.E.A. agreement applies only in a selective manner to the civilian sector with
the United States retaining the unilateral right to withdraw a safeguarded facility from coverage of the agreement. See U.S.-I.A.E.A. Treaty: Hearings on Ex.
B. 95-2 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S.-I.A.E.A. TREATY FOR SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES, ExEc. REP. No. 96-42, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)
[hereinafter cited as EXEc. REP.].
229. See, e.g., Agreement between United States and the International
Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States,

Sept. 17, 1976, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 25, 50 (1977) (the agreement was submitted to the Senate on Feb. 9, 1978); Nash, ContemporaryPractice of the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 913
(1978); see Exnc. REP., supra note 228; Hearingson Ex. B. 95-2, supra note 228.
230. See note 153 supra (Brazil stated its willingness to accept any new safeguards established by IAEA).
231. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 18, art. 18. The state carrying out
the explosion must notify the Agency as far in advance as possible of the circumstances and date of the explosion, supply detailed information on the nature
and origin of the device, and allow Agency personnel to observe all preparations,
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stances-not presently deemed likely to occur-such observations
could prove to be excessively intrusive.
Third, under the terms of article 16 of the Treaty, any party
may request a special inspection within the territory of a contracting party when it "suspects that some activity prohibited by
this Treaty has been carried out or is about to be carried out."
Upon receipt of such a request, the Council of the Agency "shall
immediately arrange" for a special inspection to be conducted.
Under certain circumstances, such an inspection could produce
negative effects. For example, if Brazil were to prepare a peaceful
nuclear device, it might be accused of building a nuclear weapon.
There are, however, inherent limitations on unfounded charges.
The request for a special inspection must pass an implicit "reasonableness" test before the Council orders an inspection, as evidenced by the requirement that the reasons underlying the request must be stated. 3 2 Any such request could occasion an
extremely grave diplomatic crisis and, therefore, would be unlikely. Also, Brazil would be required to grant inspectors free access only to places "directly and intimately connected with the
suspicion of violation of [the] Treaty. 2' 3 Finally, the only direct
measures which could be taken in the case of a negative report
would be: (1) the transmittal of the report to the contracting parties, the United Nations, and the Organization of American
States (OAS);234 (2) the convening of a special session of the General Conference of the Agency to consider the special inspection
report;2 35 (3) recommendations to the contracting parties by the
General Conference, and submission of reports to the United Nations; 238 (4) a finding by the General Conference that a contracting party "is not complying fully with its obligations under
[the] Treaty" together with appropriate recommendations to the
party concerned;23 7 and (5) a finding by the General Conference
of a violation "which might endanger peace and security," and

including the explosion itself. Agency personnel "shall have unrestricted access
to any area in the vicinity of the site of the explosion in order to ascertain [com-

pliance with information furnished and other provisions of this Treaty]." Id. art.
18(3).
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. art. 16(1)(b)(i).
Id. art. 16(4).
Id. art. 16(5)-(6).
Id. art. 16(7).
Id. art. 16(8).
Id. art. 20(1).
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transmittal of this finding to the United Nations, the OAS, and
the IAEA. 235 Thus, even in the extremely unlikely event of an un-

favorable inspection report, Brazil would have ample opportunity
to clarify the facts and reach an accommodation with the Latin
American states represented at the General Conference.
Many factors mitigating the potential disadvantages of a special inspection within Brazil simultaneously tend to weaken the
effectiveness of Brazil's right to request a special inspection
within the territory of any other contracting party which might
be suspected of violating the Treaty. Nonetheless, whatever the
decisions of the General Conference, special inspections potentially could be very useful in detecting prohibited activities.
Finally, withdrawal from the Treaty could entail certain political costs. There would be no reason for withdrawal, however, unless: (1) there were a serious breakdown in the non-proliferation
regime; (2) nuclear weapons states were to direct their military
power against Brazil and other developing nations; or (3) Brazil
were to decide, in the absence of either of the above conditions, to
proceed with the testing of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
Only in the latter case would the political costs of withdrawal be
high. However, the costs of proceeding with the tests would be
very high regardless of whether the Treaty of Tlatelolco is in
force for Brazil.
3. Exercising the Option
If the Tlatelolco option is selected, it can be exercised by waiving the unanimous ratification requirement under article 28 or by
actively promoting ratification of the Treaty and its Protocols by
all parties who have not yet done so.239 The best approach w6uld
be a combination of these. Brazil should waive all the ratification
requirements of article 28(1), except those relating to Protocol
11,240

for a period of two years.241 If all of the ratifications re-

238. Id. art. 20(2).
239. See Redick, supra note 54, at 106-07; note 203 supra.
240. This limited waiver would preserve the option out under article 28(4) of

the Treaty of Tlatelolco. That provision establishes that in the event of "the rise
of a new power possessing nuclear weapons," the treaty shall be suspended for

those states which have not waived the requirements of article 28(1)(c) and
which request such suspension. This suspension would remain in effect until the

new nuclear weapons state ratifies Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of
Tlatelolco. Id. art. 28(4); see note 194 supra.
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quired by article 28(1) have not been deposited by the end of this
period, the Treaty will no longer be in force for Brazil unless it
extends its waiver. In the meantime, Brazil should actively promote full ratification of the Treaty and its Protocols. Its own good
faith will have been demonstrated to the international community, and it will have contributed significantly to the momentum
toward final and full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
The result should be a considerable reduction in non-proliferation
pressures, thereby avoiding potential threats to the nation's acquisition of the full nuclear fuel cycle as provided under the
terms of the'agreement with West Germany. Finally, Brazil
should use full ratification of the Treaty as a bargaining chip with
the United States and in negotiations with the LAEA over a safeguards agreement which satisfies the requirements of article 13.
III.

CONCLUSION

A principal conclusion to be drawn from the preceding hypothetical view from Brazil is that a central relationship exists between the horizontal and the vertical proliferation of nuclear
weapons. Although hardly a novel finding, the reader may now be
able to appreciate more fully the degree to which the perception
of such a connection is eminently rational from the point of view
of Brazil-and perhaps other threshold nuclear powers. Whether
Brazil will endeavor to build nuclear weapons will depend largely
on the evolving nature of the international economic and political
order. To the extent that order is characterized by vertical
proliferation between the superpowers and new entrants into the
nuclear weapons club, and by political bargaining based on coercive diplomacy and the threat or use of force, Brazil will have
strong inducements to establish a nuclear weapons capability. In
addition, under a type of worst-case analysis similar to that employed by the United States military planners, Brazil's decision
whether to develop nuclear weapons will also depend largely upon
its perceptions of Argentina's potential for developing a nuclear
weapons capability.
Denial strategies will not prevent Brazil from acquiring the ca241.

The requirements of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, article 28(1), may be

waived v"wholly or in part" under the terms of article 28(2), which provides in
pertinent part: "All signatory States shall have the imprescriptible right to
waive, wholly or in part, the requirements laid down in [article 28(1)]." Here it
is assumed that waiver "in part" may be interpreted in a temporal sense.
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pability of pursuing the direct route to nuclear weapons through
the construction of dedicated facilities. Similarly, given Brazil's
acquisition of enrichment and reprocessing facilities and technology, further attempts at denial by nuclear supplier states will not
prevent Brazil from retaining the option to seize such facilities in
order to develop nuclear weapons within a very short time. Certain steps might be taken, however, which could raise the threshold for the exercise of either the direct route or the seizure option.
Any treaty providing for the acceptance of full-scope safeguards
and the prohibition of the development of any nuclear explosive
device could significantly raise the domestic commitment to
forego the development of nuclear weapons 242 and simultaneously
increase the costs of exercising any nuclear weapons option. Such
legal commitments could not guarantee that Brazil would never
construct a nuclear bomb, but they could significantly reduce the
probability of such an occurrence. In addition to such political
and legal commitments, the establishment of an IPS regime,
under which excess plutonium would be stored at an internationally managed and staffed depository in Brazil, would significantly
increase the threshold for the exercise of the seizure option.
The inherent problem is how to induce Brazil to agree to these
commitments. This will not be an easy task. The preceding hypothetical memorandum is suggestive with respect to those aspects
of both the IPS and the Tlatelolco options where the strongest
resistance from Brazil is likely to be encountered. In terms of
Brazil's own interests, it would certainly appear desirable to proceed toward full acceptance of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and participation in a limited IPS regime. These, however, are limited
steps, and one must inquire further into the types of measures
that might induce Brazil and other threshold powers to accept
the broader prohibitions referred to above, as well as a stronger
IPS regime. The best hope for drawing Brazil into such binding
legal commitments is to develop a nuclear "bargain" containing
the following elements: (1) non-discriminatory commitments between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states; (2) measures having the immediate effect of either halting or greatly slowing vertical proliferation; (3) provisions mandating the reduction of

242.

On the effect of arms control agreements on building internal commit-

ment to a treaty regime and on utilizing bureaucratic processes to inhibit its
violation, see Chayes, An Inquiry Into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements, 85 HARV. L. REV. 905 (1972).
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nuclear weapons held by the nuclear weapons states; and (4) a
combination of measures reducing the possibility of Argentine development of nuclear weapons.
Five possible components of a new non-proliferation "package"
might be acceptable to Brazil and other potential nuclear weapons states. The first of these, a comprehensive test ban treaty
(CTB), would prohibit all nuclear explosions by any state. A nondiscriminatory ban would represent a major advance in strengthening the legal commitments by non-nuclear weapons states to
forego the development of any nuclear explosive device. Although
the nuclear weapons states might object that a CTB would reduce
the reliability of their nuclear arsenals, the potential loss would
apparently not be great; 4 3 indeed, such a ban might actually increase the security of the United States and the Soviet Union by
reducing the reliability of first-strike weapons. 44 Negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom are well advanced on this issue and should be pressed to a
prompt conclusion with the participation of other states.24 Second, a treaty could be adopted by both nuclear weapons and nonnuclear weapons states banning the production of highly enriched
uranium or plutonium for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
Given their current stockpiles, the superpowers have no real need
to build additional nuclear weapons. A ban on the production of
weapons grade fissionable materials may present verification
problems, but these may be surmountable in view of the highly
sophisticated means of verification at the disposal of the
superpowers.2 46

Third, in accordance with the hypothetical Brazilian proposal
presented above, nuclear weapons states could undertake binding
243. See, e.g., Zimmerman, Quota Testing, 44 FOREIGN POL. 82, 84-86 (1981).
244. Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties: Hearings on Exec. N. Before the Senate Comm. on ForeignRelations and the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans and InternationalEnvironment of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1977) (testimony of
Paul C. Warnke).

245. U.S.

ARMS CONTROL AND DxSARMAMNT AGENCY,

1980

ANNUAL REPORT

70-76 (1981).
246. See generally Epstein, A Ban on the Production of FissionableMaterial for Weapons, 243 SCIENTIFIC AM. 213 (1980), reprintedin SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL SERVICES, SENATE COMM. ON GovERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss., READER ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION 102 (Comm. Print 1980).
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legal commitments to fully declare their existing military stocks
of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, and contribute to the
IAEA three percent per year of the stocks originally declared.
Parallel commitments would prohibit the transfer of any state's
nuclear material for civilian uses to a military nuclear program.
Fourth, an effective IPS regime might be established in order
to avoid the stockpiling of plutonium by any state. Military
stocks of plutonium held by nuclear weapons states would be subject to the second and third components described above. With
these exceptions, all excess separated plutonium in all countries
would be subject to the deposit requirements of the IPS regime.
To be effective, any IPS scheme should include a "no explosive
use" commitment, release standards that would prevent the use
of plutonium in research facilities which could be disguised dedicated facilities, and streamlined decision and dispute resolution
procedures to facilitate immediate international responses in
cases of clear violations (particularly seizure of an IPS depository). This regime should be established in a treaty in order to
achieve the highest level of domestic and international
commitment.
Last, the Treaty of Tlatelolco should be brought into force for
all Latin American countries at the earliest possible time. This
will require the Soviet Union to exert its influence to promote
Cuban ratification. Diplomatic pressure must be placed on Argentina, preferably from the Latin American states, in order to secure its ratification of the Treaty. United States ratification of
Protocol I should occur immediately.
Even if agreement on these five measures were achieved, two
additional steps would be required to ensure the continued maintenance of a strengthened non-proliferation regime. The first is a
prompt stabilization of the strategic nuclear arms race. Immediate resumption of the SALT process with a view toward early
agreement on mutual limits and reductions in nuclear forces is an
urgent necessity. The second and more time-consuming step involves the development of post-detonation deterrence strategies
and accompanying international legal machinery. Detonation of a
nuclear device need not lead to an unraveling of the non-proliferation regime as other states react by pursuing their own nuclear
weapons options. Rather, legal commitments and mechanisms
should be established which will induce a violator to return to the
status of a non-nuclear weapons state at the earliest opportunity.
Additional deterrent mechanisms must be established in order to
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halt any progression from an initial explosion to the mass production of nuclear weapons and the development of the delivery systems and defense capabilities which will make the use of nuclear
weapons a militarily viable option.
Finally, the prohibition of the threat or use of force contained
in article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter is of extreme importance. The vigor with which states seek to uphold this norm directly affects the security environment within which decisions
whether to produce nuclear weapons will be made by threshold
nuclear states. A lack of interest in bringing the ongoing war between Iran and Iraq to a halt, and potential military action
against Nicaragua, Cuba, or Poland, for example, represent events
which will foster a climate of insecurity promoting the acquisition
of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapons states.
Even if the proposals outlined above are not immediately
adopted, the two steps discussed in the hypothetical Brazilian
memoramdum could add needed momentum to the strengthening
of the non-proliferation regime. The Treaty of Tlatelolco would
provide ample warning before the detonation of any PNE to allow
diplomatic pressures seeking to reverse any initial decision to join
the nuclear club. The potential contribution of an IPS regime,
however, is somewhat more problematical, for arrangements to be
proposed by the Expert Group on IPS will not be finalized until
the end of 1982. At the Fifth Meeting of the Expert Group on
IPS, held in Vienna in May 1981, experts from twenty-eight
countries and the European Community discussed whether an
IPS regime should be established by multilateral treaty or by bilateral safeguards agreements between the IAEA and each participating state. Although a final agreement was not reached, there
was strong sentiment in favor of the bilateral approach. Bilateral
agreements would follow a model agreement adopted by collective
decision2 47 (perhaps initially by the Expert Group and eventually
by the Board of Governors). The Expert Group also considered
whether implementation of an IPS scheme should involve a Committee of States. A majority favored the establishment of a new
advisory committee to assist the Director General in managing
the IPS arrangements, yet most experts sought to deny the committee decision-making authority with respect to deposit or release of plutonium. 248
247. EXPERT GROUP, supra note 38, at 7.
248.

Id. at 8.

784

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14.711

The Expert Group also discussed whether verification of the
stated end-use should occur before or after release. There was
general agreement that some prior checking should occur, but disagreement over whether verification should extend to the quantity involved. Some experts believed that verification should occur
only after release and return of plutonium to the requesting
state.24 9 In addition, there was a consensus that there was no need
to develop guidelines relative to what constitutes the stockpiling
of completed fuel elements containing plutonium.2 50 The decision

process for release and questions relating to research and development applications of plutonium were referred to working
groups for further study. 251 Finally, it was agreed that the Sixth,
Seventh, and Eighth Meetings of the Expert Group would be held
in November 1981, June 1982, and November 1982.252
It is too early to predict the shape of the IPS scheme that the
Expert Group might propose. The regime ultimately proposed by
the Expert Group is likely to be weaker than that contained in
the hypothetical memorandum. This development is not surprising in view of the need for near-universal participation in IPS and
the fact that deliberations based on consensus decisions tend to
dilute the proliferation resistance of proposed provisions. 2 53 Given

this tendency, how weak might an IPS regime be and still be acceptable to states intent on strengthening the non-proliferation
regime? A number of states are likely to demand a lifting of national restrictions on the export of reprocessing or a surrender of
prior-consent rights for the reprocessing of supplied nuclear fuel
in exchange for their participation in IPS; therefore, it is important to understand what an IPS regime can and cannot accomplish. The basic trade-off is between easing restraints against the
spread of reprocessing facilities and acquiring legal commitments
to use plutonium only for research and in reactors. If reprocessing
plants will be built at the same rate in any event, the principal
cost associated with IPS would be that it might create a false
sense of security.
249. Id. at 10-11.
250. Id. at 12.
251. Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 14.
See Lodgard, The Role of Non-ProliferationMeasures in Strengthening the Non-ProliferationRegime, in INTERNATIONALIZATION TO PREVENT THE
252.
253.

SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

109 (SIPRI ed. 1980).
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The benefits to be derived from an IPS regime include the political and legal commitments undertaken by non-nuclear weapons states and the enhanced probability of detection of any use of
plutonium to build nuclear weapons or PNEs. A commitment to
submit all separated plutonium to the authority of IPS would
raise the threshold for any exercise of the "direct route" to nuclear weapons option. It would also strengthen internal forces operating to restrain the development of nuclear weapons. Similarly,
a comprehensive definition of excess plutonium would assure that
any use of plutonium for explosive purposes would be transparent
and immediately detected. Acceptance of prompt decision
processes capable of imposing or authorizing unilateral imposition
of serious sanctions would strengthen confidence in the regime by
providing it with greater deterrent force. Furthermore, the nature, strength, and depth of the legal commitments involved
might also affect their ability to deter prohibited actions. For example, a multilateral treaty is likely to be more effective than bilateral agreements with the IAEA. Any violation would directly
affect all participating states, both in terms of the lawful actions
they might take in response to a serious breach of the underlying
obligations,254 and in terms of the political commitment which
designed to
might be generated to support collective measures
255
sanction any violation and uphold the regime.
In conclusion, Brazil is not the only threshold nuclear power
whose decision whether to build nuclear weapons will depend
upon the degree of vertical proliferation and the evolving nature
of the international economic and political order. Before the nuclear weapons states summarily dismiss the above proposals, they
should contemplate carefully the probable consequences of Brazil
and other threshold nuclear powers proceeding with the development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. If that is a "worst254. Such actions might include non-forcible reprisals, the, possibility of
which could greatly strengthen the deterrence of fundamental violations such as
seizure of an IPS depositary. On the lawfulness of non-forcible reprisals, see A.
VERDROSS & B. SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES VOLKERRECHT 652-54 (1976); Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, in ECONOMIC COERCION AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDERS7, 14-17 (1976). While the legality of non-forcible reprisals is a highly controversial issue, parties to a multilateral treaty might,
depending on its provisions, have at least a fair legal argument justifying such
measures taken in response to seizure of an IPS store.
255. On the question of sanctions, see Szasz, Sanctions and International
Nuclear Controls, 11 CONN. L. REV. 545 (1979).
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case" scenario, it is one toward which the world is steadily drifting, and which all nations must urgently act to avoid.

